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THE  PROTRACTED WEAKNESS  of the U.S. economy that began in 1990 
(earlier  by some measures) has raised once again some long-standing 
questions about the relationship  between economic activity and the 
short-term  credit markets. To what extent did the unavailability  of fi- 
nancing  from  banks  and other  traditional  short-term  lenders  either  help 
cause the recession or, once it ended, account  for the exceptionally  ane- 
mic recovery?  Did the protracted  slowdown in all kinds  of lending-il- 
lustrated  in figure 1 by the weakness in lending  by banks  and other de- 
pository intermediaries-merely reflect the absence of loan demand 
from  conventionally  creditworthy  borrowers,  or was it also due in part 
to some "supply"  phenomenon  that  restricted  lenders'  ability,  or willing- 
ness, to advance  credit?  Among  familiar  possibilities  in this regard,  how 
important  was the impairment  of banks'  capital  positions  due to real  es- 
tate losses? Or  the apparent  toughening  of attitudes  among  bank  regula- 
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Figure 1.  Growth in Credit at Depository Institutions, 1953:1-1993:1a 
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a.  Data are plotted as a four-quarter moving average. 
tors and examiners? Or even  something as  specific as  the  Basle 
agreement  mandating  an 8 percent  capital  ratio  on a risk-adjusted  basis? 
And if there was no significant  new impediment  to lenders' willingness 
to supply credit, what other aspects of financial  market  behavior ac- 
counted for the extraordinary  slowdown in lending  activity during  this 
period? 
Distinguishing  demand  influences  from supply influences  is hardly  a 
new problem  in economics. Repeated  efforts  to do so, applied  to count- 
less markets,  have led to two generally  agreed-upon  principles. First, 
one needs to use both  price  and  quantity  data. It is difficult,  if not impos- 
sible, to identify  a demand  or supply shock by observing  only prices or 
only quantities.  Second, identification  in this context also requires  other Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  195 
information,  apart  from  prices  and  quantities,  that  can be independently 
associated  with  either  demand  or supply  behavior.  There  is no reason  to 
think  these principles  are any less relevant  to the short-term  credit  mar- 
kets than  in other standard  contexts. 
Credit markets  do present special problems, however. Most obvi- 
ously, the observable  price  of credit-the  interest  rate  on a loan-is  typ- 
ically  only one element  among  many  dimensions  that  together  constitute 
the relevant  price as seen by both borrowers  and lenders.  This problem 
clearly hinders  not only the attempt  to distinguish  supply and demand 
influences  but a much broader  class of efforts to analyze credit market 
behavior  empirically. 
From  the perspective  of trying  to unravel  the roles of supply  and de- 
mand,  however, a more  fundamental  problem  arises  from  the possibility 
that credit market  phenomena  importantly  affect economic activity at 
the aggregate  level. Suppose, for example, that the only shock to the 
economy is a sharp  reduction  in lenders'  willingness  to advance  credit, 
and  that this negative shock to credit  supply  induces  a decline in aggre- 
gate economic  activity. Further  suppose  that  the resulting  decline  in ag- 
gregate activity in turn induces potential borrowers to demand less 
credit  (because  credit  demand  is plausibly  conditional  not only on price 
but also on the volume of business to be financed).  Then both bankers 
and  economists  may accurately  report  that  the weakness of lending  vol- 
ume is largely  due to the absence of loan  demand,  even though  in a more 
fundamental  sense the only shock that has disturbed  the economy was 
to loan supply.  In the presence of noisy measurements,  the econometri- 
cian in this case could even find  that that part  of the weakness in credit 
volume attributable  to supply behavior was not statistically  different 
from zero at standard  significance  levels, and therefore  conclude that 
weak demand  was the only force at work.  ' 
Researchers  exploring the interrelationships  connecting the short- 
term  credit  markets  and real  economic activity have recently  advanced 
two separate  lines of analysis, in both cases motivated  by observed  em- 
pirical  regularities.  In earlier  work, we focused on the predictive  con- 
tent, with respect to real  output,  of relationships  among  different  short- 
term  interest  rates, in particular,  the spread  between  the commercial  pa- 
per rate and the Treasury bill rate.2 We advanced several different 
1.  Wojnilower (1992) has made this point, as well. 
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hypotheses (not mutually  exclusive) to explain  why movements  of this 
spread  might anticipate  movements of real output. Anil K. Kashyap, 
Jeremy  C. Stein, and David W. Wilcox have focused on the analogous 
predictive content of relationships  among the quantities of different 
short-term  credit  instruments  outstanding,  in particular,  the mix of bank 
loans  and  commercial  paper.3  They developed  a model,  based  on the rel- 
ative cost of loans versus paper issues, to explain why movements of 
this mix might  anticipate  movements  of real  output. 
The motivating  hypothesis  of this  paper  is that  these two lines of anal- 
ysis are, respectively, the price and quantity  sides of the same underly- 
ing  set of phenomena-and, further,  that  for  the same  reasons  that  incor- 
porating both prices and quantities in the analysis is  essential to 
successfully  distinguishing  demand  and  supply  behavior  in other  market 
contexts, here too an expanded  analysis encompassing  both price and 
quantity  aspects is needed  to understand  how what  happens  in the short- 
term  credit  markets  affects real  economic  activity  and  vice versa. In this 
spirit,  the paper's  objective  is to move beyond  the evaluation  of the sta- 
tistical properties  of the paper-bill  spread,  the loan-paper  mix, or other 
similar  "indicator"  variables, to explore more fundamental  questions 
about the economic and financial  behavior  underlying  their predictive 
content. 
The first  section begins  by placing  these price  and  quantity  investiga- 
tions, and  the substantive  hypotheses  to which  they give rise, in the con- 
text of what  has increasingly  come to be called  the "credit  view"  of link- 
ages between financial  and nonfinancial  economic activity. Part  of our 
objective here is simply  to clarify  a discussion that has often been con- 
fused by different  researchers'  meaning  different  things  while  using  sim- 
ilar (or even identical)  terminology.  More specifically, this discussion 
also seeks to distinguish  a credit view of how monetary  policy affects 
output from a credit view of financial-nonfinancial  linkages more gen- 
erally. 
The second section presents  the results  of some simple  empirical  ex- 
ercises designed  not merely  to demonstrate  the predictive  content  of the 
Friedman-Kuttner  and Kashyap-Stein-Wilcox  variables but to show 
how their  joint interaction  is also of interest  in this context. An interest- 
ing aspect of these results  is that, while they do provide  support  for the 
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paper-bill  spread,  they show that the predictive  content of the loan-pa- 
per mix variable  emphasized  by Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox is entirely 
a reflection  of the commercial  paper  quantity.  The volume  of loans con- 
tains  no predictive  information  with respect  to real  output,  and  the loan- 
paper  mix contains  none that is not already  embodied  in the volume of 
commercial  paper. This finding  turns out to foreshadow  the results of 
the more  detailed  analysis  presented  in the fifth  section. 
The third  section describes  a simple  model of short-term  credit mar- 
kets that  can serve as a vehicle for discussing  demand  and  supply  behav- 
ior in an analytically  distinguishable  way. The main  actors  in this model 
are businesses, banks, and open-market  investors. As in Kashyap, 
Stein, and Wilcox's model, here all nonfinancial  firms are homoge- 
neous.4  A novel feature  of this model is the inclusion  of a nonprice  ele- 
ment  to the cost of borrowing  through  either  loans or commercial  paper. 
Although  each of these nonprice  costs is in some sense  just a reflection 
of the extent to which reported  interest  rates fail to measure  accurately 
the true cost of borrowing,  the model's nonparallel  treatment  of how 
these costs arise in the bank loan and commercial  paper markets, re- 
spectively, adds  to its ability  to provide  substantive  explanations  for the 
predictive  content  of prices and  quantities  in these markets. 
The fourth section employs this model analytically  to examine the 
consequences of four different  kinds of shocks affecting  the financial 
markets, including shocks originating  from monetary policy,  from 
changes  in banks'  capital  position  or capital  requirements,  from  the risk 
of business  debt  default,  and  from  business  cash flows. Given  the model, 
each of these different  shocks results in a potentially  observable  set of 
price  and  quantity  responses  in the credit  markets.  An important  distinc- 
tion, however, is that while monetary  policy shocks and bank capital 
shocks imply that the relationship  between these credit market re- 
sponses and subsequent  movements  of real  economic activity  is causal, 
default  risk shocks and  business cash flow shocks do not. 
The fifth section presents the results of empirical  exercises that de- 
scribe, in a richer  way than  the simple  results shown in the second sec- 
tion, interactions  within  the credit  markets  and  between the credit  mar- 
kets and nonfinancial  economic activity. This descriptive evidence is 
4. A companion  paper,  currently  in progress,  extends  this model  to include  two sepa- 
rate  groups  of nonfinancial  firms,  those that do and those that do not have the ability  to 
borrow  in the open market  from  nonbank  lenders. 198  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
mostly consistent with an interpretation  of these interactions  based on 
shocks to monetary  policy or to corporate  cash flows, and, in some re- 
spects, also with  an interpretation  based on shocks to investors'  percep- 
tions of default  risk. The evidence is inconclusive  on the role played by 
shocks to banks'  capital  positions (perhaps  because of data  limitations, 
discussed  below). As the initial  results  from  the second section suggest, 
however, throughout  this analysis there is a contrast between results 
based  on variables  drawn  from  the commercial  paper  market  and  results 
based on variables  from the bank  loan market.  In short, the paper  mar- 
ket variables  generally  do exhibit  the predicted  behavior  while the loan 
market  variables  often do not. This finding  is ground  for caution  against 
basing  the substantive  interpretation  of interactions  between the credit 
markets  and real economic activity on any description  centered nar- 
rowly  on substitution  between bank  loans and  commercial  paper.  It also 
suggests  directions  for extending  this line of research. 
The sixth section presents the results of efforts to estimate empiri- 
cally some relationships  that correspond more directly to the more 
structural representations of  business financing, bank lending, and 
household  investment  behavior  in the model  developed in the third  sec- 
tion. Despite the use of instrumental-variable  estimation procedures, 
the resulting  estimates do not consistently distinguish  supply and de- 
mand  behavior  in such a way as to identify  satisfactorily  the price  (inter- 
est rate)  effects on these relationships-that is, the relevant  slope coef- 
ficients. By contrast, these estimates do provide  further  evidence that 
shocks to monetary  policy, to bank  capital  positions, to default  risk, and 
to corporate  cash flows affect these relationships  by shifting  them along 
the lines discussed analytically  in the fourth  section. 
The seventh section focuses more  directly  on the questions  about  the 
most recent few years' experience posed at the outset of this paper. 
Which  (if any) of these four sources of shocks played  a major  role in ac- 
counting  for the extraordinarily  slow growth of credit during  the most 
recent recession and recovery episode? Here the evidence points to 
bank  capital  shocks, default  risk  shocks, and  cash flow shocks-but,  in- 
terestingly,  not monetary  policy shocks-as  contributing  factors  under- 
lying  the credit  slowdown. By contrast,  the evidence does point  to tight 
monetary  policy, and especially to an increase in the perceived risk of 
default  on business debts, as key factors accounting  for the recession 
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researchers  about  the sharp  increase  in business  debt  burdens  during  the 
mid to late 1980s.  The eighth section collects the paper's  principal  em- 
pirical  findings. 
Credit Markets and Nonfinancial  Activity 
Just what is meant  by the increasingly  widespread  notion of a credit 
view in macroeconomics?  Is it a theory in the axiomatic  sense, or a set 
of positive statements  about  observable  behavior  that  (at least in princi- 
ple) can be submitted  to empirical  verification,  or both?  Are the relevant 
magnitudes  to observe prices or quantities,  and if they are quantities, 
are they stocks or flows? Do the relevant markets  clear? To put first 
things  first,  what  is the credit  view a view of? 
The central  focus of macroeconomics  has traditionally  been the de- 
termination  of aggregate  nonfinancial  economic activity, including  its 
real  dimensions  like output,  employment,  income, and  spending,  as well 
as the prices (both relative  and absolute)  placed on those aggregates.  A 
useful  way to clarify  what  the recent  proliferation  of interest  in the credit 
view is all about is to distinguish  thefinancial content-in  the sense of 
the roles played by whatever  financial  assets and/or  liabilities  are pres- 
ent-of  five different  lines of economic analysis  of the determination  of 
real  nonfinancial  activity. Among  these five approaches,  the first  two do 
not constitute  a credit  view but nonetheless help to frame  it. (Knowing 
what something  is not often helps in understanding  what it is.) The re- 
maining  three  do constitute  a credit  view. 
Classical  Models 
In classical models of the kind associated with Walras,  or more re- 
cently with Arrow  and Debreu, financial  markets  and what takes place 
in them  have no bearing  on the determination  of real  outcomes. Whether 
financial  markets  even exist is irrelevant  to real  output, labor  input,  the 
division of output  between consumption  and investment, and so on. If 
the economy  has a financial  side, the only aspect of it with  any relevance 
to nonfinancial  activity is whatever is used as money (in the primary 
sense of a medium  of exchange), the nominal  quantity  of which deter- 
mines  the absolute  price level, but not relative  prices, and certainly  not 
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Neoclassical  Models 
In neoclassical models, including  Keynesian variants  (and those of 
most self-styled  neo-Keynesians  and  post-Keynesians)  as well as mone- 
tarist  versions, financial  phenomena  do affect real  outcomes. The vehi- 
cle that allows them to do so-that  is, the impediment  to the establish- 
ment of  whatever outcomes would prevail in a  strictly Walrasian 
model-is  typically  the rigidity  of some absolute  price  (perhaps  all abso- 
lute prices) or of the relationship  between some two absolute prices. 
Once absolute prices are imperfectly  flexible, variation  in the nominal 
quantity  of any asset or liability  immediately  implies  variation  in the cor- 
responding  real quantity,  and in the general  equilibrium  of all markets, 
both financial  and nonfinancial,  other real outcomes may then differ  as 
well. Hence the contrast  to classical models. Neoclassical models have 
often captured  familiar  intuitions  based on empirical  relationships.  At 
the theoretical  level, the primary  challenge  confronting  such models  has 
been to establish  a satisfactory  choice-theoretic  foundation  for the im- 
perfect flexibility  that distinguishes  them from their classical counter- 
parts. (Alternative  approaches  to achieving  this result include models 
with "cash in advance" constraints  on purchases, or even a role for 
money in directly  affecting  consumers'  utility.) 
What most neoclassical models carry over directly from classicial 
models, however, is tte exclusive focus on money as the only financial 
quantity  to merit  attention. The nominal  quantity  that varies, and that 
immediately  implies  a varying  real  quantity  when prices  are imperfectly 
flexible,  is money. Some representation  of the demand  for money (even 
if only in the solved-out "quantity  equation"  form)  is therefore  charac- 
teristic  of all such models. All other  assets are implicitly  assumed  to be 
imperfectly  substitutable  for money but perfectly substitutable  for one 
another,  and the demand  for them collectively is implicitly  modeled  by 
the description  of money  demand  together  with  whatever  determines  to- 
tal wealth holding.  As for liabilities,  neither  households  nor firms  typi- 
cally have any in such models. If they do, their  liabilities  are  perfect  sub- 
stitutes for their nonmoney  assets and hence are also irrelevant  to the 
determination  of real  outcomes. In "representative  agent"  models, there 
can be no such liabilities  even if markets  for them  exist, since there  is no 
reason for two identical agents to enter into an arrangement  whereby 
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Models  that  are  neoclassical  in this sense can also include  a multiplic- 
ity of imperfectly  substitutable  nonmoney  assets, although  this elabora- 
tion  is much  less typical.  For example,  in James  Tobin's 1961  model  and 
also in his 1969  "Model  II,"  imperfect  substitutability  between  real  capi- 
tal and government-issued  bonds is central to the analysis.' Even so, 
such models do not present  a credit  view in the sense intended  here be- 
cause they do not include  liabilities  issued by inside agents  like firms  or 
households. 
Credit Models:  The General Case 
What distinguishes  the credit view from conventional neoclassical 
models is the recognition  that households and/or  firms  do have liabili- 
ties, together  with  the presumption  that  these liabilities  play  a role in the 
determination  of nonfinancial  economic activity that is at least concep- 
tually  on a par  with that  reserved  for money in neoclassical  models. For 
private  economic  agents' liabilities  to matter  in this way, it must  be true 
that  not all nonmoney  assets are perfectly  substitutable  one for another. 
Private  agents  therefore  have balance  sheets, in the nontrivial  sense that 
there  are  distinguishable  assets and  liabilities,  and  that  any  agent's  liabil- 
ity must  be some other  agent's asset.6  It must  also therefore  be the case 
that  not all private  agents  are identical. 
The nontrivial  existence of balance sheets for households and/or 
firms  introduces  two forms  of financial  variables  that  can  then  be posited 
to play a role in the determination  of nonfinancial  economic activity: 
stocks and flows. Different  expositions of the credit view have empha- 
sized either  or both, and  much  unnecessary  confusion  has resulted  from 
the typical  failure  to recognize  that,  whatever  may  appear  important  em- 
pirically,  the conceptual  basis  for a role  of one typically  implies  a role  for 
the other  as well. The most immediately  transparent  credit  view models 
focus on flows, distinguishing  the opportunity  cost of funds generated 
internally  by firms, or earned by households, from the (presumably 
greater)  explicit cost of external  debt financing.7  Balance sheet stocks 
5. Tobin  (1961,  1969). 
6. Tobin  was an early advocate  of assigning  a central  role to inside agents' balance 
sheets in this context. See, for example, "Model  III"  in Tobin  (1969)  and the overview 
provided  there. 
7.  See Duesenberry  (1957)  for a statement  of early views to this effect. More  recent 
empirical  contributions  in  this  vein include  Fazzari,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1988),  Gertler 
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enter  the analysis  naturally  as a straightforward  extension  of this differ- 
ence. If the opportunity  cost of certain  assets held is like that of inter- 
nally generated  funds but less than the cost of external  debt financing, 
real spending  or production  decisions may depend not only on cash 
flows, but  also on the stock of such assets held.8  Further,  if the marginal 
cost of debt  financing  is not fixed  but instead  depends  (presumably  posi- 
tively) on the quantity  of debt already  owed, relative  to the borrower's 
ability  to pay as measured  by either  income  or assets, then stocks of lia- 
bilities  and  perhaps  of other  assets too can also affect real  outcomes. 
Like neoclassical models in a different  context, models embracing 
the credit  view capture  a variety  of familiar  intuitions  based  on empirical 
relationships.  Similarly,  while neoclassical  models  face the challenge  of 
establishing  satisfactory  choice-theoretic  foundations  for  the price  rigid- 
ities or incomplete  markets  that imply  different  real outcomes than the 
corresponding  Walrasian  equilibriums,  the credit view faces the chal- 
lenge of establishing  such  foundations  for the differential  cost of internal 
and  external  funds, or a rising  marginal  cost of debt  finance.  At the most 
fundamental  level, such models must  account  for what makes one non- 
money asset imperfectly  substitutable  for another  and hence makes  lia- 
bilities not trivially  identical  to assets. The main  lines of analysis intro- 
duced to  address these  questions in  recent years have exploited 
advances in the theory of imperfect information,  of relationships  be- 
tween principals  and their  agents, and of the incentives  and constraints 
embodied  in contracts.9 
Credit Models  of Monetary Policy 
In the abstract,  the notions that nonmoney  assets are not all perfect 
substitutes,  that liabilities  exist and are distinct, and that balance  sheet 
stocks and/or flows matter  for the determination  of nonfinancial  eco- 
nomic activity-that  is, the central  core of the credit  view-need  imply 
little or nothing  about how monetary  policy works. Shocks emanating 
8. Anderson  (1964)  first made this point in the context of firms' holdings  of liquid 
assets. A recent  example  of a model  in which  liquid  assets held  matter  for  investment  deci- 
sions is Whited  (1991). 
9.  See, for  example,  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976),  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981),  and  Myers 
and Majluf  (1984).  Greenwald  and Stiglitz  (1988)  provided  a useful summary  of many  of 
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from the central bank's monopoly over the supply of bank reserves 
presumably  represent  only one of the many kinds of shocks to which 
an economy is subject. Even in a model in which other shocks influ- 
ence nonfinancial  activity through  a process involving private sector 
liabilities and balance sheets, as a practical matter monetary policy 
shocks could still have their effect largely through  the equilibration  of 
the demand for and supply of money as spelled out in neoclassical 
models. 
In fact, however, many researchers  advancing  credit view models 
have done so as an explicit  alternative  to the neoclassical  account  of the 
monetary  policy process.  '0 What  immediately  makes the credit view at 
least potentially  relevant  to monetary  policy is that  banks  (and  other  de- 
pository intermediaries)  have balance sheets too. Given the banking 
system's capital position, or net worth, anything  that affects the total 
amount  of bank liabilities  correspondingly  affects the total amount  of 
bank assets. Monetary  policy may therefore affect nonfinancial  eco- 
nomic  activity by influencing  banks'  ability  to create deposits, or by in- 
fluencing  their  ability  to extend credit,  or in both ways. The force of the 
deposit mechanism  presumably  hinges at least in part  on whether  bank 
liabilities,  seen as assets in households'  and  firms'  portfolios,  are substi- 
tutable  for nonmoney  assets. The  force of the credit  mechanism  depends 
at least in part  on whether  households  and firms  see nonbank  financing 
as substitutable  for bank  loans. 
Which of these two accounts of the monetary  policy process more 
nearly  corresponds  to the prevailing  empirical  relationships  in any given 
economy at any given time is clearly  an important  question,  with imme- 
diate  implications  for monetary  policymaking.  (For example,  would the 
central  bank  do better  to target  bank  liabilities  or bank  assets? Or  would 
it do even better  to use, even if only as an information  variable,  a broader 
measure  encompassing  nonbank  liabilities  or assets?) But  even if the an- 
swer is that the deposit process is empirically  more important,  or per- 
haps  even self-sufficient,  in the specific  context of how monetary  policy 
works, credit view models in the more general sense described  above 
may still  be useful and  even important  in describing  influences  on nonfi- 
nancial  economic activity  apart  from  monetary  policy. 
10. See, for  example,  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988),  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989),  and 
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Credit Rationing  Models 
The brief sketch of credit view models offered  above, be they of the 
more general kind or specific to monetary  policy, says nothing  about 
markets  not clearing.  By contrast,  in some models  of how credit  market 
phenomena  affect nonfinancial  economic activity, the center of atten- 
tion is precisely  on circumstances  in which would-be  borrowers  cannot 
obtain financing  at all, and therefore  face what amounts  to a quantity 
constraint  on their  ability  to spend  for purposes  of consumption,  invest- 
ment, or production.  In many such models, the presence and/or  inten- 
sity of this kind of market  failure  varies over time, and the motivating 
argument  at an empirical  level is that "credit  crunches"  of limited  dura- 
tion and irregular  occurrence account for a significant  part of the ob- 
served  fluctuation  of real  output  and spending.  " 
Framed  in the context of modern  theories of imperfect  information, 
principal-agent  relationships,  and  contract  theory  (which  have provided 
the choice-theoretic  foundations  for recent  credit  view models), market 
failures  of the kind  emphasized  in such credit  crunch  stories are simply 
an extension of the same behavioral elements that make nonmoney 
assets not all  perfect  substitutes,  and  private  sector liabilities  distinct,  in 
the first  place. It is now well known that adverse selection, moral  haz- 
ard, and other phenomena  that arise when information  is asymmetric 
and when agents act on behalf of principals  can produce  market  situa- 
tions in which potential  lenders  will not finance  some would-be  borrow- 
ers at any interest  rate, so that the credit  market  does not clear even in 
the strict sense of the term.  12 It is also straightforward  to posit reasons, 
many  of them connected to just the balance  sheet stocks and flows that 
are at center stage in credit view models, why the forces that prevent 
credit markets  from clearing may vary in intensity over time. Hence 
models  of credit  rationing,  or occasional  crunches,  are  at least as consis- 
tent with economic first principles as neoclassical models in which 
money matters  because of price rigidities,  and  probably  more so. 
The fact that  credit  view models  can encompass  nonclearing  markets 
does not mean  that  they necessarily  do so; on this point  too, substantial 
11. See, for example, Wojnilower  (1980), Eckstein and Sinai (1986), Owens and 
Schreft  (1992),  and  the earlier  references  given in those papers. 
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confusion exists. Credit view models may involve ongoing rationing 
and/or occasional crunches, or they may not. If they do, the credit 
crunches that occur may or may not be empirically  important  in ex- 
plaining  fluctuations  in real activity. Credit view models in which the 
markets  for all assets and  liabilities  always clear  represent  no less an al- 
ternative  to the money-centered  neoclassical model than do models of 
explicit  financial  market  failure. 
What This Paper Is About 
The line of research  developed  in this paper  falls squarely  in the third 
and  fourth  categories  described  above. The model presented  in the pa- 
per's third  section incorporates  not only nonmoney  assets that are im- 
perfect  substitutes  for  one another  but  also private  sector  (for  simplicity, 
here only firms')  liabilities  that are not trivially  identical  to assets, and 
in general  balance sheet stocks and/or  flows affect real spending. The 
analysis  explicitly  considers  monetary  policy shocks, and  as it does so, 
these credit view elements are potentially  at work alongside  the equili- 
bration  of the deposit market  taken  over from  the standard  neoclassical 
model.  The analysis  considers  other  shocks too, however:  to firms'  cash 
flows, to the perceived riskiness of firms'  liabilities, to banks' prefer- 
ences for loans versus securities  on the asset side of their  balance  sheets, 
and so on. Hence the model presented  below potentially  offers a credit 
view not only of monetary  policy as in the third  category  but  more  gener- 
ally, as in the fourth  category,  as well. By contrast,  there  is no provision 
here for markets  not to clear. While  the spirit  motivating  this line of re- 
search  is certainly  consistent  with the existence and  even importance  of 
credit  crunches, therefore,  such phenomena  do not occur in the formal 
model presented and they play no explicit role in the analysis of this 
paper. 
Some Illustrative Empirical Relationships 
Before embarking  on this analysis, is there evidence to suggest that 
either  price or quantity  variables  that are consistent with a credit view, 
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Table 1.  F-Statistics for Alternative Financial Indicators in Real Output Equationsa 
Sample period 
1960:1-  1960:1-  1973:6- 
Financial  variable  1992:12  1979:9  1992:12 
Monetary base  1.26  0.62  1.01 
Ml  1.98b  1.36  1.54 
M2  3.27d  3.42d  1.05 
Debt  1.07  0.84  0.31 
Paper-bill spread  7.49d  3.65d  6.64d 
Nonfinancial  paper  3.02d  1.31  6.56d 
Total commercial  paper  3.32d  3.57c  2.49c 
Loans  ...  ...  0.86 
Loan-paper mix  ...  ...  2.13b 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based on Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve, Release H.3 and H.6 for 
monetary  base, MI, M2, and debt, all seasonally  adjusted;  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve, Release 
G.13, for prime  six-month  commercial  paper  and six-month  auction  average  Treasury  Bill rates;  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of New York,  Market  Reports  Division,  for nonfinancial  and  total  commercial  paper;  Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
various  issues, table 1.24,  for loans  (other  commercial  and  industrial  loans).  The loan-paper  mix is outstanding  loans 
divided  by the sum  of loans  and nonfinancial  commercial  paper. 
a. F-statistics  for the null hypothesis  that the coefficient  on the financial  (quantity)  variable  is zero. Regressions 
are based  on equation  I of the text, where  the dependent  variable  is the change  in the log of industrial  production. 
The regressions  use monthly  data for the sample indicated,  and include six lags of each independent  variable. 
Analogous  results  using  twelve lags are similar  except for two cases: M2, which  is not significant  in the full sample, 
and total  paper,  which  is not significant  in the post-1973  sample. 
b. Significant  at the 10 percent  level. 
c.  Significant  at the 5 percent  level. 
d. Significant  at the I percent  level. 
model, are systematically  related  to real  economic  activity?  Table 1  pre- 
sents F-statistics  for the null hypothesis that all coefficients 0i are zero 
in regressions  of the form 
6  6 
(1)  =  Oc +  fi  t-i  +  .  iApt-i 
6  6 
+  i  rl  pt_i+ +  O)AZ_ +  4t  +  Ut, 
where X and P are the natural  logarithms  of industrial  production  and 
the producer  price  index, respectively;  r is the interest  rate  on six-month 
prime  commercial  paper;  Z is, in turn,  each of a series of other  financial 
variables  as listed in the table; u is a disturbance  term;  and c, Pi, -yi,  bi, 
Oi,  and  + are  all coefficients  to be estimated.  Data  are monthly.  The table 
presents results separately  for the full 1960:1-1992:12  sample and for 
two subsamples: 1960:1-1979:9  (that is, up until the Federal Reserve 
system's adoption  of new monetary  policy operating  procedures  in Oc- 
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data  on bank  loans, a key element in the line of research  developed by 
Kashyap,  Stein, and Wilcox).  '3 
These results readily  show the empirical  appeal  underlying  our own 
research  and, in a less direct  way, that  of Kashyap,  Stein, and  Wilcox.  14 
In contrast  to the standard  money and credit  aggregates,  the paper-bill 
spread  variable  we emphasized  exhibits  a highly  significant  relationship 
to subsequent  movements in real economic activity, even in the pres- 
ence of the interest rate, regardless  of which sample period is under 
study.'5 So does the quantity  of commercial  paper, which is a key ele- 
ment in Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox's analysis. Although  the quantity 
of bank  loans is itself not significant  over the sample  for which monthly 
data are available  for this variable,  the loan-paper  "mix"  ratio empha- 
sized by Kashyap,  Stein, and Wilcox is (weakly)  so. 
Focusing in more detail on just the 1973-92  sample, table 2 extends 
these results  to show the relevance,  for the determination  of real  output, 
of price-quantity  interactions  in the short-term  credit  markets.  The table 
shows F-statistics  from regressions  that are identical  to equation 1 ex- 
cept that  they include  both  the paper-bill  spread  and, in turn,  each of the 
other financial  variables  listed in table 1 (along  with output, prices, the 
interest  rate,  and  a linear  trend,  all  as before).  The most immediately  vis- 
ible result  shown  in table  2 is that  the predictive  content  of the paper-bill 
spread  remains  highly  significant,  no matter  which  of the other  variables 
is included along with it. The volume of commercial  paper issued by 
nonfinancial  firms  also retains  its strong  significance  in the presence of 
the spread  (although  the significance  of the loan-paper  mix disappears). 
Especially when the quantity  under  study is the volume of commercial 
paper,  therefore,  these results  suggest  that  the price  and  quantity  dimen- 
sions of the short-term  credit  markets  do not  just convey identical  infor- 
mation  in alternative  forms. From  the perspective  of predictive  content 
with respect to real  output,  looking  at credit  prices does not make  look- 
ing at credit  quantities  irrelevant,  nor  vice versa. 
13. Data  for industrial  production,  the price  level, and  all money  or credit  aggregates 
are seasonally  adjusted.  Data  for interest  rates  are  not. 
14. Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1992, 1993)  and  Kashyap,  Stein,  and  Wilcox  (1993). 
15. Previous  research  going  back to Sims (1980)  has emphasized  the criterion  of sig- 
nificance  even in the presence  of the interest  rate. When  a regression  like  equation  1  does 
not include  an interest  rate regressor,  other  variables  may be significant  merely  because 
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Table 2.  F-Statistics for Quantity Variables in Combination with the Paper-Bill Spread, 
1973-92 Subsamplea 
Paper- 
bill  Quantity 
Quantity  variable  spread  variable 
Monetary base  6.33c  0.87 
Ml  5.81c  0.93 
M2  6.16c  0.76 
Debt  6.65c  0.47 
Nonfinancial  paper  5.62c  5.54c 
Total commercial  paper  5.82c  1.85b 
Loans  6.58c  1.02 
Loan-paper  mix  5.97C  1.71 
Source:  See  table  1. 
a.  F-statistics  for the  null hypothesis  that the coefficient  on  either  the  paper-bill spread or quantity  variable  is 
zero.  Regressions  are  based  on  equation  I of  the  text,  but also  include  the  paper-bill  spread as  an  independent 
variable, where the dependent variable is the change in the log of industrial production. The regressions  use monthly 
data for the  1973:6-1992:12 sample, and include six lags of each independent variable. Analogous results using twelve 
lags  are  similar,  except  for  total  commercial  paper,  which  is  not  significant,  and  the  loan-paper  mix,  which  is 
significant at the  10 percent level. 
b.  Significant at the  10 percent level. 
c.  Significant at the  I percent level. 
The finding  in tables 1  and  2 of greater  predictive  power  in the volume 
of commercial  paper  issuance than in the loan-paper  mix ratio, and of 
none at all in the volume of bank  loans, warrants  some further  prelimi- 
nary analysis to learn  just what aspects of short-term  credit quantities 
are most relevant  to the determination  of real output. Given Kashyap, 
Stein, and Wilcox's definition  of the loan-paper  mix as m  L/(P  +  L), 
where  L and  P are the outstanding  volumes of bank  loans and commer- 
cial paper, respectively, it is straightforward  to decompose the change 
in the mix (the form  that, because of considerations  of stationarity,  ap- 
pears  in the regressions  reviewed  above) as 
(2)  Am, = m,t  l (1 -  m,  1)  L,/L,_  -  m,t  l (1  -  ) APt  , 
where the discrete-time  approximation  approaches  exactness in contin- 
uous time. If the mix is the appropriate  measure of short-term  credit 
quantities  to use for purposes  of information  about subsequent  output 
fluctuations,  then the appropriately  weighted /\L/L and /\P/P  terms in 
equation  2, entered  in place of /\m in regressions  for real  output,  will ap- 
pear with coefficients  (approximately)  equal in magnitude  but opposite 
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Table  3. Performance  of Loan-Paper  Mix and Paper-Bill  Spreada 
Regression  Silm of  F- 
specification  Independent  variable  specification  coefficients  statistic 
Includes  financial  Separate  paper  and lending  terms 
flows  Weighted  change  in commercial  paper  - 0.82c  2.49c 
Weighted  change  in bank  lending  -0.38  1.24 
Loan-paper  mix and paper  terms 
Change  in loan-paper  mix  -0.38  1.48 
Weighted  change  in commercial  paper  -  1.21  1.86b 
Includes  interest  Separate  paper  and bill rate terms 
rates  Change  in paper  rate  -1 .23b  2.99d 
Change  in bill rate  1.01  2.98d 
Paper-bill  spread  and paper  rate terms 
Paper-bill  spread  -  0.85d  6.03d 
Change  in paper  rate  -0.08  3.  10C 
Bill rate constrainte  ...  6.05d 
Source:  See table  1. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  real output.  The  regressions  are  based  on  monthly  data for  1973:6-1992:12,  and 
include six lags of each  independent  variable. The regressions  are specified  according to the first two  columns  and 
as described  in the text. 
b.  Significant at the  10 percent level. 
c.  Significant at the 5 percent level. 
d.  Significant at the  I percent level. 
e.  Constraint that the coefficients  on  the  spread and the  paper rate are such  that only  the  differenced  bill rate 
appears in the regression. 
The upper  panel  of table  3 shows that  this is not the case empirically. 
In a regression  of real output  on separate  distributed  lags of both com- 
mercial  paper  and bank  loans (along  with output  itself and the price in- 
dex) for the same 1973-92  sample  used above, the summed  coefficients 
on the commercial  paper terms are negative as predicted, but so are 
those on the lending  terms-although, as is to be anticipated  from  tables 
1 and 2, neither  the t-statistic  for the sum nor the F-statistic  for all the 
coefficients  together  is statistically  significant  in the case of bank  loans. 
By contrast, a simple reparameterization  of this same regression, re- 
ported immediately  below in the same panel of the table, shows that 
when the loan quantity  is omitted  and the mix variable  is entered in its 
place, neither  it nor  the paper  quantity  is significant.  In other  words, the 
mix variable  and the paper  quantity  contain  the same predictive  infor- 
mation  about subsequent  fluctuations  of real output.  16 Once again, the 
coefficients  on the commercial  paper  quantity  are negative. 
16. Kuttner(1992)  reported  similar  results  for  analogous  tests based  on quarterly  data. 210  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Since the regressions  underlying  tables 1 and 2 already  include  both 
the paper-bill  spread  and  the commercial  paper  rate,  and  the spread  does 
exhibit  highly  significant  predictive  context with  respect  to output  in the 
presence  of the paper  rate, a similar  analysis  focused on the spread  vari- 
able should  clearly  bear  different  implications.  As the lower panel  of ta- 
ble 3 shows, the paper  rate  and  the bill rate  are each individually  signifi- 
cant at the 0.01 level when the two are entered  together  in a regression 
for real  output.  Reparameterizing  this same  regression  to include  the pa- 
per-bill  spread  in place of the bill rate makes  the contrast  to the corres- 
ponding  result with the mix and the commercial  paper  quantity  all the 
more  apparent.  The spread  is significant  at the 0.01 level in the presence 
of the paper  rate, and vice versa at the 0.05 level. Moreover,  in a sepa- 
rate  regression  the data  also reject  at the 0.01 level the further  restriction 
that the coefficients  on the spread  just cancel the corresponding  coeffi- 
cients on the paper  rate  so that  the relevant  predictive  content  is actually 
contained  in the bill rate  alone. 7 
In sum, the U.S. empirical  evidence exhibits  four main  features  that 
together suggest useful avenues for research on the relationship  be- 
tween real output  and short-term  credit  markets.  First, both prices and 
quantities  in the short-term  credit markets  contain statistically  signifi- 
cant information  about subsequent  fluctuations  in real output. Second, 
the information  about  real  output  contained  in these respective  price  and 
quantity  variables  is not identical.  Third,  much  of the relevant  informa- 
tion from price variables  in this context is contained  in relative prices, 
like the spread  between the commercial  paper  rate  and  the Treasury  bill 
rate. Fourth, the relevant information  from short-term  credit market 
quantities  is contained  mostly in the volume of commercial  paper  issu- 
ance; specifically,  neither  the volume  of bank  loans nor  the relationship 
17. Because  considerations  of stationarity  dictate  entering  either  the paper  rate  or the 
bill rate  separately  in differences,  but  the spread  in levels, the form  of the constraint  here 
is 
0, + +  = 0 
0, +  2  -  +1  =  0 
06  +  k6  -  (N  =  0 
07  -  k  =  0 
where  the Oi  and  Xi  are the distributed  lag coefficients  on the spread  and on the bill rate, 
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between  loan volume  and  paper  volume  (except in so far  as it merely  re- 
flects  paper  volume  alone)  appears  to matter  much  for the determination 
of real  output. 
A Model of Credit Markets and Their Interaction 
with Real Output 
What  set of circumstances  describing  the short-term  credit markets 
might systematically  give rise to interactions  with real output of this 
form?  A minimal  description  of the credit  markets  for this purpose  must 
bring together the behavior of three distinct kinds of private-sector 
agents (banks, open-market  investors, and homogeneous  nonfinancial 
firms)  interacting  in three different  markets (those for Treasury  bills, 
bank loans, and commercial paper). In addition, as in neoclassical 
models, the analysis must include a market  for whatever constitutes 
money. This section sketches the outlines  of such a model.'8 
Nonfinancial  Firms 
The place to begin is with the behavior of nonfinancial  firms, here 
taken  to be homogeneous,  and to be denoted  in the aggregate  with a su- 
perscript  F. The i-th firm's  balance  sheet constraint,  implicitly  defining 
its stockholders'  equity  as the difference  between  its assets and  its liabil- 
ities, is 
(3)  PEi  + Bi  =  Li +  pi  + Ei, 
where  PE represents  the firm's  stock of physical capital,  B its holdings 
of Treasury  bills, L its debt owed to banks,  P its commercial  paper  out- 
18. Even with these markets  and three kinds  of private  sector agents, however, this 
model  can account  for the observed  interactions  in only limited  ways. For example, be- 
cause  there  is no market  for  long-term  assets or liabilities,  the entire  term  structure  dimen- 
sion of portfolio  choice is omitted.  There  is also no role here for international  aspects of 
even the short-term  markets.  A companion  paper, currently  in progress,  expands the 
model  by further  distinguishing  between nonfinancial  firms  that can borrow  in the open 
market  and those that cannot, and introducing  credit advances between them (trade 
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standing,  and  E its net worth.  '9  The corresponding  financing  constraint, 
equating  total uses of funds for investment  with total sources of funds, 
is 
(4)  P +  ABi = NRi + ALi + AP9 
where  I represents  investment  outlays and NR stands  for net revenues 
from  operations  not paid out in interest  or dividends.20  Under standard 
conditions  admitting  aggregation,2'  the financing  constraint  for all firms 
together  is 
(5)  I +  ABF  =  NR + ALF +  IPF. 
A central assumption  of the credit view is that conditions in the fi- 
nancial  markets  play a causal  role in determining  firms'  nonfinancial  in- 
vestment  and  net revenues. But regardless  of whether  that  is so or those 
aspects of firms'  nonfinancial  behavior  are predetermined  with respect 
to their financial  choices, equation  5 shows that the gap between I and 
NR must  be financed  by some combination  of loans, paper  issuance, and 
sales of bills previously  held. Over a time horizon  such that firms'  non- 
financial  investment  and net revenues are predetermined  with respect 
to contemporaneous  conditions  in the financial  markets,  their  financing 
choice for a given financing  gap I -  NR reflects standard  principles  of 
risk-averse  portfolio  selection, supplemented  here by the nonprice  (that 
19. A more  realistic  model  would  reflect  the fact that  nonfinancial  firms  also typically 
hold deposits  and sometimes  issue long-term  debt, and that some firms'  equity value re- 
flects goodwill as an asset. Adding  deposits to the left-hand  side of equation  3 and ex- 
panding  equation  6 to include  an  additional  portfolio  equation  would  make  the model  more 
complex  but  does not seem to provide  any further  analytical  insights.  Doing  the same  for 
long-term  debt  on the right-hand  side  of equation  3 would  introduce  a variety  of potentially 
interesting  substantive  issues, but  for the most part  they lie well beyond  the scope of this 
paper.  Assets like  goodwill  are  also beyond  the scope of this paper. 
20. In principle,  issuance  of equity securities  is another  potential  source  of funds  for 
nonfinancial  firms.  In practice,  most U.S. firms  are more  likely to retire  equity  securities 
than  to issue more,  and  aggregate  net issuance  of equity  by nonfinancial  business  corpora- 
tions  has been  negative  in most  years  since World  War  II. Expanding  the model  to include 
a market  for corporate  equities (as either a source or a use of funds)  would raise many 
questions  that  lie beyond  the scope of this paper. 
21. See Theil  (1971,  chaper  11)  for a discussion  of aggregation  and  the familiar  repre- 
sentative  agent  model.  Here  as elsewhere,  a genuinely  plausible  description  of the  relevant 
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is, other than the observed interest rate) costs of obtaining  external 
funds, 
A\LF =If  (I  -  NR,  rL,  OL,  rp,  OP,  rB) 
(6)  ApF  f2  (I  -  NR,  rL,  OL, rP, OP,  rB) 
ABF  =f3  (I -  NR,  rL,  rLP,  Op,  rB) 
where the ri  are the interest  rates in the three short-term  markets,  the O0 
are  the corresponding  nonprice  cost elements  (assumed  to be zero in the 
bill market), and expected signs are shown below the corresponding 
variables.  Given  equation  5, the usual  cross-equation  restrictions  apply, 
so that  the system in equation  6 contains  only two independent  relation- 
ships. 
Nothing  in equation  6 as written  reflects  either  a greater  cost of exter- 
nal financing  compared  to internal  funds or the possibility of a rising 
marginal  cost of external financing  as firms  have more debt outstand- 
ing-two  standard  features  of credit  view models  as indicated  in the first 
section. Differential  costs of internal  and external funds are largely a 
matter  of whether  theflow of net revenues  from  operations,  NR, enters 
the investment  function  (as it does below). If the cost of debt is rising  at 
the margin,  however, then both the investment  function  and equation  6 
may also include the outstanding  stocks of loans and paper, and the 
stock of nonfinancial  capital  from  the balance  sheet.22  In addition,  since 
no firm's  holdings  of Treasury  bills can be negative,  in general  the stock 
of bills will also enter these expressions even though  the return  to bills 
(as seen by any firm)  is of course fixed no matter  how many bills are 
held.23  As is well known, once either the investment function or the 
22. More  specifically,  these balance  sheet stocks will enter the equations  describing 
firms'  behavior  if the firm  itself is responsive  to such considerations  as the risk of bank- 
ruptcy  or the volatility  of its net revenues. By contrast,  if the banks  and  other investors 
who hold the firms'  securities  are sensitive  to these matters  but the firms  themselves  are 
simply  present  value-maximizers,  then  firms'  balance  sheet stocks will  affect  their  behav- 
ior indirectly  through  the market-determined  rates  of return  on their  obligations,  but  bal- 
ance sheet stocks would  not appear  directly  as arguments  of the equations  describing  the 
firms'  behavior. 
23. The argument  here  is analogous  to that  made  explicitly,  just below, about  the role 
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equations  describing  firms'  financial  decisions do include  balance  sheet 
stocks of either  assets or liabilities,  the resulting  model then provides  a 
vehicle for describing  stock-flow  dynamics  as is familiar  in a variety  of 
theoretical  and  empirical  contexts. 
Banks 
The firms that behave in this manner interact with two separate 
classes of lenders. Banks, to be denoted in the aggregate  with a super- 
script B, issue deposits, including  ordinary  transactions  accounts as 
well as deposit certificates  (which are negotiable but uninsured),  and 
against  these deposits  they hold Treasury  bills and  commercial  loans. In 
addition,  by law, each bank  must  meet two constraints.  First, part  of its 
assets, equal to or greater  than some stated fraction  of its outstanding 
deposits, must  consist of zero-interest  reserves held  at the central  bank. 
Second, the bank must support  a part  of its assets, equal to or greater 
than  a (different)  stated  fraction,  with capital  rather  than  deposit liabili- 
ties. Because these two restrictions  are inequalities,  they are not neces- 
sarily  binding  at the margin. 
The i-th bank's  balance  sheet constraint  is 
(7)  Bi + Li + Ri = Di  +  CDi +  Ki 
where  R represents  reserves,  D transactions  deposits, CD certificates  of 
deposit, and  K the bank's  capital  position.  The bank's  reserve  and capi- 
tal requirements  are, respectively, 
Ri >  Di k, +  CDik2, 
(8) 
Ki -  Lik3  +  Bik4, 
where the kj, 0 c  k1  < 1, are fractions  set by the relevant  regulatory  au- 
thorities.  A key feature  of these requirements  as they currently  apply  in 
the United States is that  k2 =  k4 =  0. That  is, transactions  deposits are 
reservable  but certificates  are not, and under  the Basle agreement  (al- 
though not for the "tier one leverage ratio")  banks must hold capital 
against  their  loans but not their  securities. 
If the model is taken literally  as a simple one-period  model, with R 
and K fixed for the period, the inequalities  in equation  8 are straight- 
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ties D and CD.24 Because banks can readily  exchange reserves among 
one another  (in  effect, most bank  transactions  are settled  by transferring 
reserves),  what  is given is not each bank's  individual  Ri  but  the aggregate 
R supplied  by the central  bank. By contrast,  for purposes  of the capital 
requirement,  each bank's individual  Ki is what matters,  so the distribu- 
tion of Ki among  individual  banks  within  the aggregate  K is relevant  as 
well.25 
In any more  dynamic  model, however, there  is always the possibility 
that a bank that does not now face a binding  reserves or capital con- 
straint  may do so later. Expanded  loan opportunities  may arise, or the 
bank  may experience large deposit outflows (which cause its Ri to de- 
cline), or it may experience defaults  on its existing loans (which cause 
its Ki to decline), or the regulators  may even raise the relevant  ki. For a 
given distribution  describing  the probability  of any or all of these kinds 
of shocks, the probability  that the bank's reserves or capital  contraint 
will become binding  later  depends  negatively  on the amount  by which  R i 
or Ki exceeds the requirement  now. Hence there are implicit  nonzero 
shadow  prices on reserves and capital,  even for banks  for which the re- 
spective constraints  are  not binding.  It is plausible  to think  of both  R and 
K as arguments  of the equations  describing  the banks' choice of B, L, 
D, and CD, along  with the standard  portfolio  theoretic  arguments,  here 
including  the noninterest  return  to bank  loans, OL.26  The resulting  repre- 
sentation  is 
BB =  b1 (rB,  rL ,  u2,  OL,  rD,  rp, R,  K) 
(9)  -  + -  ?  -  -  +  ? 
DB =  b3 (rB,  rL,  ,2  OL, rD,  rp, R,  K) 
CDB =  b4 (rB,  rL,  ,  OL,  'D  rp, R,  K), 
+  +  -  +  +  -?+ 
24. The resulting  solution  would  be of the Kuhn-Tucker  form. 
25. In parallel  to the treatment  of nonfinancial  firms  above, the model  developed  here 
assumes  that  banks  cannot  raise  capital  by issuing  new equity  within  the period;  see again 
footnote  20. 
26. The  practice  of treating  the quantity  of reserves  as a direct  argument  of the deposit 
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where  U2 iS the risk of default  on loans (Treasury  bills are default-free), 
rD  is the rate  paid  on transactions  deposits, and expected signs are again 
shown  below the variables.  Here rp, the interest  rate  on commercial  pa- 
per, represents  the interest  rate on certificates  of deposit because open- 
market  investors (modeled below) are assumed to treat banks' certifi- 
cates and firms'  paper  as perfect substitutes,  and therefore  to arbitrage 
the two assets' returns  into equality.27  Given banks' role as takers of 
transactions  deposits, the most plausible  interpretation  of the equation 
for DB is in governing  banks' choice of rD.  The risk  of default  uc2, which 
reflects not only the risk associated with firms'  returns  on nonfinancial 
investment  but also the relationship  among their respective stocks of 
assets and liabilities  as described above, affects banks' willingness to 
lend negatively, and hence their demand  for Treasury  bills positively 
and  their  supply  of deposits negatively. 
The system shown in equation  9 determines  the composition  of the 
banking  system's balance sheet but says nothing explicitly about its 
scale. Given  the reserve  and  capital  requirements,  however, the scale of 
the banking  system at any specific time is determined  by the amount  of 
reserves supplied by the central bank and the amount of capital that 
banks have accumulated  from past earnings  (or equity issues). Given 
that  certificates  of deposit  are not reservable  and  Treasury  bills carry  no 
capital  requirements,  it might seem that the banking  system would ex- 
pand  indefinitely  if rB> rp,  but  in fact rp >  rB  and  so the preferences  with 
respect to balance  sheet composition  reflected  in equation  9 also deter- 
mine banks' scale once R and K are given. While R and K are both 
strictly  positive influences  on the banking  system's scale, therefore,  the 
structure  of equation  8 still  renders  their  effects on banks'  portfolio  com- 
position asymmetric. Specifically, as the undetermined  derivatives in 
equation 9 indicate, changes in R have differential  effects on banks' 
choice of liabilities, while changes in K have differential  effects on 
banks'  asset choices. 
levels of interest  rates, is standard  in the literature  of money supply;  see, for example, 
Meigs (1962)  and Modigliani,  Rasche, and Cooper  (1970).  The parallel  treatment  here of 
bank  capital  follows the reasoning  set forth  by Brainard  (1964). 
27. Representing  certificates  of deposit as a distinct asset in investors' portfolios 
would  again  make  the model  more  complex  without  adding  insight  that  is directly  relevant 
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Households 
Finally, open-market investors-what  most  models identify as 
households,  although  that designation  misses the essence of this analy- 
sis-choose  among transactions  deposits, Treasury  bills, commercial 
paper, and certificates  of deposit, all in a manner  constrained  by their 
accumulated  net saving. Here open-market  investors in the aggregate 
are denoted  by a superscript  H. In the absence of household  borrowing 
opportunities,28  the i-th investor's  balance  sheet constraint  is just 
(10)  NAi  +  Di  +  Bi  + Pi  +  CDi  =  NWi, 
where NA represents  nonfinancial  assets and NW stands  for net worth 
(in this case identical to total assets). The corresponding  constraint 
equating  total uses of funds  with total sources is 
(11)  ADi +  Bi  + APi + ACDi  = NS, 
where  NS represents  saving  net of accumulation  of nonfinancial  assets. 
If equation 11  admits  aggregation,29  standard  principles  of portfolio  se- 
lection under  conditions  of risk  then result  in 
ADH  =  hI (NS,  rD, rB, rp, c2,  Op, Y) 
(12)  MBH =  h2  (NS,  rD, rB, rp, ur2,  Op, Y) 
+?  -  -  ?  ?  - 
ApH +  ACDH =  h3 (NS, rD,  rB,  rP,  2OP,  Y). 
+  -  +  - 
The demand  for money for purposes of executing transactions  is pre- 
sumably  the origin  of the distinct demands  (and in general, therefore, 
different  interest  rates)  for transactions  deposits and Treasury  bills, de- 
spite  the absence  of risk  on either  asset. This  demand  mandates  the pres- 
ence of income Yin the deposit demand  equation  (and  in general,  there- 
fore, in each of the other  two asset demands).  As before, the applicable 
28. Modeling  not only firms' borrowing  and capital spending  but households'  bor- 
rowing  and  accumulation  of nonfinancial  assets too would  add  little in the context of this 
model.  Open-market  investors  like pension  funds  and  insurance  companies  do little  free- 
standing  borrowing,  and  their  holdings  of nonfinancial  assets are  also limited. 
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restrictions  mean  that  the system in equation  12  contains  only two inde- 
pendent  equations. 
Nonprice  Costs  of Borrowing 
While  it is widely  known  that  reported  interest  rates  often  do not mea- 
sure  accurately  the true cost of borrowing,  few models  include  any con- 
crete attempt  to allow  for the effects of whatever  other  costs account  for 
this discrepancy.  The inclusion  here  of OL and  Op-and, in particular,  the 
nonparallel  treatment  of these two nonprice  cost elements  from  the per- 
spective of lenders-strengthens  this model's ability to explain ob- 
served relationships  between price-quantity  interactions  in the credit 
markets  and real economic activity of the kind documented  in the sec- 
ond section. From the perspective of nonfinancial  firms, the two non- 
price costs of borrowing  are parallel.  Greater  OL depresses ALF  just as 
would higher  rL, while greater  Op  depresses  APF  just  as would higher  rp 
(and,  just below, either greater  OL or greater  Op  depresses firms'  nonfi- 
nancial  investment).  The nonparallel  treatment  lies in the effect of these 
nonprice  costs on lenders. 
As many  researchers  have emphasized,  banks  typically  have ongoing 
relationships  with their borrowers.30  In the case of loans, therefore,  OL 
represents  charges-either explicit (like origination  and servicing  fees) 
or implicit  (like compensating  balances, or the requirement  to purchase 
unrelated services like underwriting  or trust operations)-earned by 
banks  as lenders.  Interpreted  to be net of any additional  direct  expenses 
of originating  and servicing  a particular  loan, the elements  of OL are  just 
additional  ways (beyond  interest  payments)  for the bank  to earn  a profit 
from the transaction.  Hence greater  OL increases banks' willingness  to 
lend,  just as does higher  rL. 
Observers of bank lending relationships  typically report that over 
time  these noninterest  charges  tend  to increase  or decrease  as loan  inter- 
est rates  rise or fall, so that  it is reasonable  to treat  OL in part  as a positive 
function of rL.  To the extent that banks move rL  only sluggishly  in re- 
sponse to changes  in supply-demand  conditions  in the loan  market,  how- 
30. See again,  for  example,  Bernanke  (1983),  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1986),  and  Gertler 
and  Gilchrist  (1993a).  For a summary  of the earlier  literature  treating  bank  customer  rela- 
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ever, even this partial covariation is  presumably highly imperfect. 
Moreover,  OL  plausibly  varies  both  with  the volume  of loans  outstanding 
and  with the change  in loans outstanding,  since some kinds  of noninter- 
est charges (for example, compensating  balances)  are logically related 
to the ongoing  level of financing  while others (for example, origination 
fees) pertain  to new financings  only:3' 
(13)  OL  =OL(rL,  L,  AL). 
In contrast  to banks,  open-market  investors  by definition  have no on- 
going relationship  with the borrowers  to whom they lend, and hence 
cannot  capture  all, or in some cases any, of the charges  Op  that  represent 
noninterest  costs to borrowers. Open-market  investors must at least 
partly  share  these costs, which  then accrue  as profit  to dealers,  advertis- 
ers, rating  agencies, and  the like.32  Hence greater  Op  depresses not only 
ApF,  as is the case for bank  loans, but  ApH also. Since the costs that  bor- 
rowers  must  incur  for such purposes  as establishing  dealer  relationships 
or obtaining  agency ratings  do not accrue  to lenders, there is no reason 
for Op  to covary with rp. By contrast,  these costs (and  the profits  made 
from  them)  do depend  on the volume  of business  done in the commercial 
paper market, as the discussion below elaborates, and here too what 
matters  is presumably  both the volume  of paper  outstanding  (and  being 
continually  refinanced,  since commercial  paper  is a short-term  liability) 
and  the change  in that volume:33 
(14)  fp =  fp (P,  AP). 
31. Since  OL represents  a marginal  cost of borrowing,  for  OL to increase  with  L and  AL 
requires  that  fees and  other  charges  rise more  than  in proportion  to the volume  of lending. 
32. To the extent that part  of the charges  making  up either  OL or Op  merely  serve to 
cover some entity's direct  expenses associated  with  a specific  transaction,  it presumably 
does not  matter  whether  that  expense  is incurred  by and  reimbursed  to a bank  or, for  exam- 
ple, a rating  agency  or a securities  dealer.  For purposes  here, however,  both  OL or Op  are 
to be  interpreted  as net  of such  direct  expenses, and  hence  as profit  to some  entity  involved 
in the transaction. 
33. Some of the noninterest  costs of issuing  commercial  paper,  like the cost of estab- 
lishing  a dealer  relationship,  are mostly one-time  costs. More  paper  being  issued by the 
same  firms  that  have always issued paper  therefore  has a different  implication  than  does 
more paper  being  issued because there are new issuers. An aggregate  relationship  like 
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Table 4.  Financial Assets and Liabilities, by Holder and Obligor 
Asset/liability 
Flow 
Holde-lobligor  Bills  Loans  Paper  Deposits  CDs  Reserves  constraint 
Nonfinancial 
firms  + ABF  -ALF  -  ApF  =  NR -  I 
Banks  + ABB  + ALB  -  ADB  -ACDB  +  ?RB  =  0 
Households  + ABH  +  ApH  +  JDH  + ACDH  =  NS 
Government  -  BG-  ARG  =  - DEFa 
Market-clearing 
condition  =0  =0  =0  =0  =0  =0 
Source:  Based  on  the  equations  and  conditions  as  described  in  the  text. 
a.  DEF  is  the  consolidated  federal  government  budget  deficit. 
Market Clearing 
Given participation  in the short-term  credit markets  by nonfinancial 
firms,  banks  and open-market  investors  as described  in equations  3-14, 
market  clearing  requires 
ABF  +  ABB  +  ABH  =  ABG 
ALLB  =  ALLF 
(15)  ApH  =  ApF 
ADH  =  ADB 
ACDH  =  ACDB 
A&RB  =  ARG 
where  BG  is the outstanding  volume of Treasury  bills (net of ownership 
by the central  bank  and by foreign  investors)  and  RG  is the outstanding 
volume of reserves created  by the central  bank. (The superscript  G de- 
notes the government  sector.) Table 4 provides the standard  tableau 
summarizing  this set of market-clearing  conditions  together  with  the bal- 
ance sheet restrictions  embedded  in equations  6, 9, and 12. 
Links to Nonfinancial  Activity 
The representation  of the behavior  of firms,  banks, and open-market 
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only. Relevant  aspects of firms'  and  households'  nonfinancial  activity- 
firms'  investment  and revenues, households' saving and accumulation 
of nonfinancial  assets-enter  this description  but are not determined 
there. What  is missing  is the connection  between  the financial  prices  and 
quantities  determined  in equations  3-15 and nonfinancial  outcomes. In 
most simplified  models, of either the neoclassical or the credit variety, 
the main  link between the financial  markets  and real economic activity 
is firms'  investment  behavior. 
If the model is not to dictate before the fact any conclusion about 
whether the empirical  connection between short-term  credit markets 
and real activity is causal, the representation  of investment behavior 
must include the makings  of financial  influences  on investment  as well 
as independent  influences  determining  investment  that,  in turn,  needs to 
be financed.  Given the spirit  of the description  of financial  behavior  in 
equations  3-15, the most natural  starting  place  for such a representation 
focuses on matters  of risk and return.  In addition,  however, a principal 
object of the model developed here is to admit  a potential  role for bal- 
ance sheet stocks and flows, as well as to expand the treatment  of the 
risk and return  variables  to allow for nonprice  elements of borrowers' 
cost of financing. 
A skeletal  representation  of firms'  investment  that  excludes any bal- 
ance sheet stock variables  is 
(16)  I = I(NR,r,  -  r,  ,&2), 
?  ?  --_ 
where, apart  from purely  stochastic fluctuations  (due to unintended  in- 
ventory accumulation,  for example)  investment  responds  positively to 
net revenues from operations,  positively to the excess of the expected 
rate  of return  on investment  r, over firms'  composite  interest  cost of ad- 
ditional  funds  r, negatively  to the corresponding  composite of nonprice 
elements  of firms'  cost of external  funds 0, and negatively  to the risk  u2 
associated  with  firms'  return  on investment.  The composite  interest  cost 
-r  depends  on rL, rp, and  rB  with weights  that  reflect  the respective  impor- 
tance of AL, AXP,  and AB that firms  choose in their financing  of invest- 
ment  at the margin.  The composite  noninterest  cost 0 depends  in an anal- 
ogous way on OL and Op.  The presence of NR in equation  16  reflects  the 
standard  credit  view assumption  that internal  funds are less costly than 
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pal-agent  interactions, and contracts).34  Finally, in addition to these 
arguments  of equation 16, a rising cost of debt at the margin,  as dis- 
cussed above in connection with firms'  financing  choice in equation  6, 
would  also imply  a role for balance  sheet stocks LE  and  pF,  and  the non- 
negativity  constraint  on firms'  holdings  of bills would likewise imply a 
role  for  BE. 
At a formal  level, closing the model then simply  requires  making  ex- 
plicit the standard  dependence of aggregate  spending  (income) on in- 
vestment,  of firms'  revenues  on spending,  and  of saving  on income (and 
perhaps  on interest  rates). Given the two government  variables  RG and 
BG, banks' capital  position  K, and all existing  balance sheet stocks, the 
resulting  model is then sufficient  to determine  the market-clearing  val- 
ues of all of the financial  quantities,  interest  rates, and nonprice  financ- 
ing costs in equations  3-15, as well as nonfinancial  investment  in equa- 
tion 16. What remains undetermined,  of course, is the prospective 
return  r, and  risk  U2 associated with firms'  nonfinancial  investment.  But 
that  is a matter  for a different  paper. 
Hypotheses  about the Credit Markets and Real Economic 
Activity 
How then can the model sketched  immediately  above account  for the 
observed relationships  between the short-term  credit markets  and real 
economic activity? And does whatever interaction  is involved imply 
that  the predictive  content  of credit  market  variables  with  respect  to real 
activity  is causal? 
A Causal Hypothesis:  Monetary Policy  Shocks 
One such mechanism,  suggested  by Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, as 
well as by our  own work, centers  on monetary  policy and  does make  the 
observed  relationships  causal.35  Given  equation  9, a tightening  of mone- 
tary  policy in the form  of a negative  shock to RG restricts  banks'  willing- 
ness to make loans, so that the loan interest  rate increases and the vol- 
34. Whether  investment  is codetermined  with net revenues,  so that  the financing  gap 
I-NR  is ajointly  determined  variable  in equation  6, is a matter  of time  lags. 
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ume of loans decreases. As firms  that do not receive bank loans seek 
credit  elsewhere, specifically  in the commercial  paper  market,  both the 
quantity  of paper  issued and the associated interest  rate  increase. With 
higher  interest rates on financing,  firms'  investment  declines. As is fa- 
miliar,  such a negative  monetary  policy shock also raises interest  rates 
more broadly.  Banks may seek to shrink  their balance sheets not only 
by cutting  back  on loans but also by selling  bills, and  firms  also sell bills 
from their portfolios (or accumulate  less) as a way of obtaining  addi- 
tional investable  funds. In the meantime,  the supply of bills to be held 
by all private  investors together is greater, because the central  bank's 
means  of reducing  the quantity  of reserves is to sell bills to the market. 
Hence interest rates rise not only in the loan and paper  markets  but in 
the bill market,  too. 
With  plausible  lags in the investment  function, this story clearly can 
account  for the empirical  regularity  emphasized  by Kashyap,  Stein, and 
Wilcox, that firms'  mix between loan and paper  financing  tends to shift 
toward  paper  in advance of a decline in real output. (Recall, however, 
a caveat flagged  in the second section, that the predictive  content with 
respect to real output  is contained  entirely  in the volume of paper  issu- 
ance, with essentially none in the behavior  of bank  loans; more on this 
below.) By contrast, it is not obvious that anything  in this process will 
cause the paper-bill  spread  to widen in advance  of a decline in real out- 
put. The general  equilibrium  of the credit markets  described  above im- 
plies that  a negative  shock to RG  will produce  an increase  in the bill rate 
along with the rates on loans and  paper, and  there is no reason why the 
paper  rate increase should systematically  exceed the bill rate increase 
as tends to occur empirically.36 
One  way of accounting  for this phenomenon  would  be to appeal  to the 
heterogeneity  of firms.  If the obligations  of borrowers  that  shift  from  the 
bank  loan market  to the commercial  paper  market  when monetary  pol- 
icy tightens  are systematically  less attractive  to open-market  investors 
than  the obligations  of borrowers  whose paper  is already  outstanding- 
either  because these new borrowers  are less creditworthy,  or because 
36. As we explained  in an earlier  work  (Friedman  and  Kuttner,  1993),  the differential 
tax treatment  of Treasury  bills and commercial  paper  can account  for some widening  of 
the paper-bill  spread  as interest  rates in general  rise, but we also showed  that  the part  of 
the variation  of the spread  not accounted  for in this way also has predictive  content  with 
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they deal in smaller  volume so that their paper  is less liquid-then  the 
resulting  rise in risk or loss of liquidity  for the representative  issuer's 
paper  will lead  the market-average  commercial  paper  rate  to rise relative 
to the rate  on Treasury  bills (or any other  instrument  for which risk  and 
liquidity  remain  unchanged).  This is essentially the story told verbally 
by Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, although  it stands outside the model 
they present, which assumes homogeneous  borrowers.  Making  such a 
story  explicit would  require  a model with  at least two classes of firms.37 
A way of accounting  for the widening  of the paper-bill  spread  in these 
circumstances,  even when all borrowing  firms  are homogeneous, is to 
exploit the fact that investors recognize the differing  tax, risk, and li- 
quidity  features  of commercial  paper  and  Treasury  bills, and  hence treat 
these instruments  as imperfect substitutes in their portfolios. When 
assets are imperfectly  substitutable,  changes  in their  relative  supplies  in 
general  affect their  relative  market-clearing  expected returns.  In earlier 
work, we showed that the relative supplies of commercial  paper and 
Treasury  bills do have statistically significant  effects, in the direction 
predicted  by standard  portfolio  analysis, on the paper-bill  spread.38  As 
long as the increase  in the quantity  of paper  that open-market  investors 
have to hold  when  monetary  policy tightens  is relatively  greater  than  the 
corresponding  increase  in the quantity  of bills  to be held, a direct  conse- 
quence of that  tightening  is a widening  of the paper-bill  spread. 
Finally, the model of the short-term  credit  markets  developed in the 
third  section of this paper  can also account  for an increase  in the paper- 
bill spread  when monetary  policy tightens  because of the role played by 
the nonprice  cost of commercial  paper  issuance, Op,  and  in particular  the 
asymmetry  between Op  and  the nonprice  cost of bank  loans, OL. Figure  2 
illustrates  the basic interaction  at work  by plotting  borrowers'  and  lend- 
ers' behavior  in the respective markets  for bank  loans, commercial  pa- 
per, and Treasury  bills. The negative shock to RG shifts the A\LB  curve 
inward  A\L  falls and  banks  raise  the measured  price  of loans  rL,  and  prob- 
ably the nonobserved  price element  OL,  as well. (Because the equations 
37. Moreover, the paper-bill  spread systematically  widens in these circumstances 
even when, as in the results  presented  in the first  section and in Friedman  and Kuttner 
(1992, 1993),  the paper  rate  is calculated  only from  issues rated  P1 (the highest  rating)  by 
Moody's  Investors  Service. Hence the heterogeneity  at work  would  have to be within  the 
P1-rated  subset of firms. 
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in the model  are simultaneous-that is, curves plotted  in figure  2 to rep- 
resent borrowers'  and lenders'  behavior  in each market  are conditional 
on outcomes in the other markets-any  attempt  to describe  the effects 
of a specific shock verbally  is necessarily imprecise  because it is only 
sequential.) 
As firms  that otherwise would have borrowed  from banks then turn 
to the commercial  paper  market,  not only does rp  rise, but Op  increases 
for either or both of two reasons, both intuitively  reflected  in equation 
14. First, if firms  that normally  borrow  at banks  do not have preexisting 
commercial  paper  programs,  they must incur  a cost to establish  a rela- 
tionship  with a dealer  in this market.39  The resulting  dealer's  profit  con- 
stitutes a cost that must be paid in some proportion  by borrowers  and 
lenders. Second, in addition  to the cost of establishing  and maintaining 
a dealer relationship,  when firms  borrow  in the open market  someone 
must monitor  their  performance  and  prospects  on behalf  of lenders. As 
Ben S. Bernanke  has emphasized,  in his own work  and work  with Mark 
Gertler,  a key role traditionally  played by banks is to perform  just this 
monitoring  function.40  When  firms  that normally  borrow  at banks  move 
into the open market,  the burden  placed on market  analysts, indepen- 
dent rating agencies, and lending institutions themselves becomes 
greater. 
Depending  upon how this additional  cost is shared  between borrow- 
ers and  lenders, either  A  pF  shifts outward  by less than  would  otherwise 
be the case, or APH shifts inward,  or both as illustrated  in figure  2. In 
addition,  with  reserves  more  scarce, banks  may  increase  their  eagerness 
to issue (nonreservable)  certificates  of deposit, as indicated  in equation 
9. The new equilibrium  in the paper  and  CD market  may have the quan- 
tity A\P  + ACD  either  greater  (as shown in figure  2) or smaller  than be- 
fore the negative monetary  policy shock, but the price rp  is unambigu- 
ously greater.  Moreover,  because Op  represents  a cost to borrowers  or 
lenders, or both-again,  in contrast to OL,  which is an element of the 
price that lenders receive from borrowers-the  increase in rp  exceeds 
the increase  in other  short-term  interest  rates  to which such  costs do not 
pertain.  Hence the credit  market  consequences  of a tightening  of mone- 
tary policy include not only a decline in the loan-paper  mix but also a 
39. Nonfinancial  corporations  do not normally  place  their  own commercial  paper. 
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widening  of the paper-bill  spread,  even though  the inward  shift  in any or 
all of ABE, ABB  and ABH,  and the outward shift in ABG,  increase  rB as 
well. And as long as firms' investment  is sensitive to the price and/or 
nonprice  cost of financing,  real  economic activity  declines. 
Another Causal Hypothesis:  Bank Capital Shocks 
Much  of the discussion  of the 1990-92  weakness  in lending  illustrated 
in figure 1, and of the connection between the weakness in lending  and 
the sluggishness  of the recovery of real economic activity  following  the 
March 1991  recession trough, has focused not on monetary  policy but 
on arrangements  surrounding  banks' capital requirements.4'  In brief, 
the argument  has three elements:  The Basle accord  in effect raised  k2  in 
equation  8 to 8 percent, while maintaining  k4 =  0.42 Loan losses, espe- 
cially in their  real  estate portfolios,  reduced  K at many  banks.  And more 
vigorous supervision  by the regulators  further  reduced  many banks' K 
by classifying  as problematic  many loans on which borrowers  had not 
yet defaulted. 
The effect of an increase  in k2  and/or  a reduction  in K is to render  the 
capital requirement  binding  for some banks at which it was not so al- 
ready.  For yet other  banks,  following  the discussion  in the third  section, 
the effect is to narrow  the margin  by which the requirement  is not bind- 
ing, and  hence to increase  the shadow  cost on capital  in a dynamic  con- 
text. On both  counts, banks'  willingness  to lend is reduced,  as indicated 
in equation  9, and so A\LB  again  shifts inward  as in figure  2. As firms  that 
cannot  obtain  bank  loans seek funds  in the paper  market,  A  pF  +  ACDB 
again  shifts  outward  as in figure  2. 
The fact that banks' assets differentially  affect their  required  capital 
while their liabilities  differentially  affect their required  reserves, how- 
ever, means that the further  consequences of a negative shock to bank 
capital  (or an increase  in the capital  requirement)  are not necessarily  as 
described  above for the case of a monetary  policy shock. Unlike in the 
wake  of a negative  monetary  policy shock, here  banks  have no incentive 
to issue more certificates  of deposit, and so firms'  greater  issuance of 
41. See, for example,  Syron  (1991). 
42. See Baer  and  McElravey  (1993)  for a detailed  account  of the Basle standards  and  a 
brief but comprehensive  history of previous bank capital requirements  in the United 
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commercial paper is now the only reason why ApF  +  ACD  in figure 2 
would  shift  outward.  Also, as equation  9 indicates,  here  there  is less rea- 
son to expect banks  to reduce  their  holdings  of securities,  and  they may 
even increase their securities holdings in order to avoid shrinking  in 
overall  scale when capital  is inadequate.  Hence the inward  shift of ABF 
+  ABB  +  ABH in figure 2 is now mostly,  or perhaps entirely, a matter of 
firms'  and households'  behavior.  Unlike an open market  operation  that 
withdraws  reserves, a negative shock to banks' capital  positions does 
not involve any outward  shift  of ABG. 
As this comparison  makes  clear, merely  looking  at the behavior  of in- 
terest rates and loan volumes-the  standard  fare of most discussions of 
whether  greater  capital  requirements  and/or  banks'  loan  losses have cre- 
ated  a credit  crunch-is  not sufficient  to distinguish  a negative  bank  cap- 
ital  shock  from  a negative  monetary  policy shock. In both  cases loan  vol- 
ume  falls, all interest  rates  rise, and  the paper  rate  rises by more  than  the 
bill rate. And in both cases these happenings  in the financial  markets 
play a directly  causal role in retarding  real economic activity. Only by 
bringing  into the analysis additional specifics of the banks' balance 
sheet, like CD issuance and securities  holdings, is it possible to distin- 
guish  these two kinds  of shocks. 
A Noncausal  Hypothesis:  Default  Risk Shocks 
While  it is certainly  plausible  that the predictive  content of the loan- 
paper mix and the paper-bill  spread reflects a mechanism  by which a 
shock that initially  affects the credit  markets  ultimately  affects real  out- 
put, it is also entirely  possible that what underlies  the comovement of 
these variables  with real  output  is not causal  at all. Either  the mix or the 
spread  may simply fluctuate  in anticipation  of changes in real activity 
that occur for independent  reasons.43  From a purely predictive stand- 
point-that is, whether  the mix or the spread,  or both, can serve as lead- 
ing  indicators-the distinction  is moot. If the leading  indicator  is to play 
a role in the central bank's formulation  of monetary  policy, however, 
the distinction  is not only relevant  but important.4  Moreover,  from the 
43. The distinction  at issue here is the same as that highlighted  by Tobin  (1970)  in a 
different  context. 
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perspective  of gaining  an understanding  of the nature  of interactions  be- 
tween the credit  markets  and  real  economic  activity, evaluation  of com- 
peting  hypotheses is of the essence. 
One of our earlier  papers  and  a paper  by Bernanke  considered  an ex- 
planation  for the predictive  content  of the paper-bill  spread  that  implies 
no causal  influence  from  the credit  markets  to real  activity.45  In the con- 
text of a model  like that  developed  in this paper,  this hypothesis  can also 
potentially  account  for the predictive  content of the loan-paper  mix (al- 
though not of the volume of paper issuance per se). In contrast  to the 
causal  hypotheses  sketched  above, in which  the central  elements  are  the 
nonprice  costs of borrowing  Oi,  here the focus is on the lending  risk  or2. 
It is well known (and hardly  surprising)  that bankruptcies  and debt 
defaults  vary with the state of overall economic activity. When  lenders 
anticipate  that an economic downturn  is about  to occur, and hence that 
defaults  by borrowers  with cyclically sensitive cash flows have become 
more likely, the greater  perceived risk reduces their willingness  to ad- 
vance funds  to private  borrowers  at any given interest  rate. Hence mea- 
sured  interest  rates on defaultable  credits like bank  loans and commer- 
cial paper rise relative to rates on default-free  credits like Treasury 
bills.46  At the same time, the volume of issuance of defaultable  credits 
declines. If banks  are more  averse  to assuming  such risks  than  are  open- 
market  investors, or if banks are more exposed to such risks because 
open-market  obligations  are senior to bank  loans in the event of bank- 
ruptcy,  then  loan  volume  will decline  by more  than  paper  volume  so that 
the loan-paper  mix also declines. 
To the extent that investors' anticipations  of future  economic fluctu- 
ations tend on average  to be correct, these induced  movements  in both 
the paper-bill  spread  and the loan-paper  mix will predict  movements  in 
real output, despite the lack of any causation running  from the credit 
markets  to real  activity. Further,  if investors'  anticipations  in this regard 
embody  information  from  disparate  sources (like knowledge  of individ- 
ual companies),  or information  that is otherwise  difficult  to quantify  or 
to summarize  in a compact way, the spread  and the mix will have pre- 
45. Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1993)  and  Bernanke  (1990). 
46. Measured  interest  rates  on defaultable  securities  would  rise  relative  to default-free 
rates even if lenders were risk-neutral,  because the expected gross return  equals the 
quoted  gross interest  rate  times  the probability  of payment.  The increase  will, of course, 
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dictive  content  even in the presence  of standard  aggregate  variables  that 
conventionally  appear  in regressions  for real  output. 
Figure  3 illustrates  this mechanism  in the context of the model pre- 
sented  in the third  section. A positive shock to o2 causes the A\LB  curve 
to shift  inward,  increasing  rL  but  reducing  A\L  for  a given  ASLF  curve. Sim- 
ilarly,  greater  o2 causes the A  pH  +  ACDH  curve to shift  inward,  increas- 
ing rp  but reducing  AP for a given ApF  +  ACDB  curve. In the bill mar- 
ket, greater  o2  causes both ABB and ABH to shift outward, while ABF 
shifts inward  as firms  liquidate  securities  holdings  as a means of finan- 
cing. If the outward  shift for banks and households is greater  than the 
inward  shift  for firms,  as shown in figure  3, the result  is to reduce  rB  (for 
given quantity  of bills outstanding  and  with  no response  from  the central 
bank). Hence the widening  of the paper-bill  spread  is straightforward, 
but whether  interest  rates rise or fall depends on which rate one has in 
mind.  Whether  the loan-paper  mix increases  or declines depends  on the 
relative responses of A\LB  and ApH  to u2,  as well as on relationships 
among  the various  elasticities  in equations  6, 9, and 12.  (Once  again,  this 
inherently  sequential  verbal  description  fails to capture  the simultaneity 
of the underlying  model.) 
This noncausal  hypothesis  is similar  to the two causal  ones described 
above in that all three imply a widening  of the paper-bill  spread and, 
under  the right  conditions,  a decline in the loan-paper  mix in advance  of 
a decline in real  output.  At a finer  level of detail, however, the different 
hypothesized  shocks suggest different  implications  for both prices and 
quantities.  On the price side, a negative  monetary  policy shock, a nega- 
tive bank capital shock, and a positive default  risk shock all imply in- 
creases in rL  and rp  before a decline in output, but the monetary  policy 
and bank capital shocks imply an increase in rB,  while the default risk 
shock implies  a decrease  in rB.  On  the quantity  side, all three  shocks im- 
ply a decline in A\L  before a decline in output, but the monetary  policy 
and bank  capital  shocks imply an increase  in AP, while the default  risk 
shock implies a decrease in AP. At least in principle,  these differences 
should  provide  a handle  by which to distinguish  empirically  among  the 
various  shocks. 
Another Noncausal  Hypothesis:  Cash Flow  Shocks 
Finally, in our earlier  work we advanced  yet another  hypothesis to 
explain the predictive  content of the paper-bill  spread with respect to Figure 3.  Effects of a Positive Default Risk Shock 
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real  output,  and  under  the right  conditions  it, too, is consistent  with the 
observed  comovement  of real  output  and  the loan-paper  mix.47  The cen- 
tral focus of this hypothesis is the cyclical variation  in nonfinancial 
firms' cash flows. As in the case of shocks to default risk, but unlike 
either monetary  policy shocks or bank capital shocks, prediction  here 
does not necessarily  imply  causality. 
As equation 5 makes clear, a crucial determinant  of nonfinancial 
firms'  financing  is the gap between their  investment  and their net reve- 
nues from operations.  Either  a positive shock to investment  (for exam- 
ple, an increase in unintended  inventory accumulation)  or a negative 
shock to revenues-each  of which is hardly  atypical  as economic activ- 
ity nears  a business  cycle peak-enlarges firms'  financing  gap  and  there- 
fore increases  their  demand  for financing  from  all sources. In figure  4, a 
negative  shock to net cash flow in this sense (net of investment, that  is) 
causes the A\LF  and (ApF  +  CDB) curves to shift outward  (and  ABF to 
shift inward).  The result  is an increase  in quantity  in both the loan mar- 
ket and  the paper  market,  and  an increase  in both  interest  rates:  A\L,  A\P, 
rL, and rp are all greater.  Given the rise in rL and rp, the ABB and ABH 
curves in the Treasury  bill market  both shift inward along with ABF 
Hence rB rises as well. 
Once again,  either  the imperfect  substitutability  of commercial  paper 
and  Treasury  bills or the nonprice  element  of the cost of commercial  pa- 
per issuance  can account  for the behavior  of the paper-bill  spread  under 
conditions  of borrower  homogeneity.  As more  firms  borrow  in the paper 
market, and in larger  amounts, the increasing  cost Op  drives a bigger 
wedge between what borrowers  pay and what lenders receive. Hence 
ApH  shifts inward  (because what is on the vertical  axis is just rp) and rp 
rises relative  to rB.  From the standpoint  of accounting  for the behavior 
of the loan-paper  mix, here, as in the case of a default  risk shock, what 
matters  is just the relative  elasticities exhibited  by the relevant  aspects 
of the portfolio behavior  of firms, banks, and open-market  lenders as 
specified  in equations  6, 9, and 12, respectively. 
Although  this analysis  of cash flow shocks  therefore  bears  similarities 
to that of the other shocks considered  above, here too there are differ- 
ences. On the price side, negative cash flow shocks resemble negative 
monetary  policy shocks or negative  bank  capital  shocks, but differ  from 
47. Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1993). Figure 4.  Effects of a Negative Cash Flow Shock 
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positive default  risk shocks, in implying  that rB  increases along with rL 
and  rp  in advance  of a downturn  in real  output.  On  the quantity  side, neg- 
ative cash flow shocks differ  from any of the other three shocks in im- 
plying that both A\L  and A\P  increase in advance of a downturn.  Once 
again,  such differences  are the stuff  of empirical  analysis. 
Descriptive Evidence on Responses to Financial Shocks 
The central  advantage  of a model  like that  developed  here is the facil- 
ity that  it provides  for examiningjust  this kind  of distinction  between  the 
effects of different  kinds of shocks. Given the model, it is straightfor- 
ward  to say, qualitatively,  what comovements  between financial  prices 
and financial  quantities,  and between financial  variables  and nonfinan- 
cial economic  activity,  follow from  any given kind  of shock. The empiri- 
cal question is then whether  the corresponding  comovements actually 
observed  bear  out these predictions. 
Monetary Policy  Shocks 
Although  the model developed in the third section includes no ex- 
plicit dynamics,  the relationships  under  discussion  there-including es- 
pecially  the role of balance  sheet stocks-and  the responses  to different 
shocks analyzed  in the fourth section surely stretch out over time. In- 
vestigating  the interactions  that ensue following  any given shock there- 
fore requires  a dynamic  representation.  Figure 5 presents impulse re- 
sponse functions summarizing  the behavior  of a series of four-variable 
vector autoregressions  designed to focus on the behavior of financial 
prices and quantities  (as well as aggregate  nonfinancial  activity) in re- 
sponse to monetary  policy shocks. 
In each four-variable  system examined in figure  5, two of the vari- 
ables are the level of real output  (gross domestic product)  and the first 
difference  of the corresponding  implicit  price deflator,  and  a third  is the 
federal  funds  rate,  taken  as an indicator  of monetary  policy.48  The fourth 
variable  in each case is the financial  price  or quantity  variable  indicated 
48. Bernanke  (1990),  Bernanke  and Blinder  (1992),  and other researchers  have had 
empirical  success using the federal  funds rate as a monetary  policy indicator.  See Sims 
(1992),  however,  for  arguments  against  identifying  funds  rate  innovations  as monetary  pol- 
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in the corresponding  row of figure  5; each impulse response shown in 
that row is based on the vector autoregression  with that variable  as the 
fourth  variable.  In each case, the figure  shows the estimated  impulse  re- 
sponse and the associated one-standard-error  band around  it. For the 
purpose  of calculating  these responses, the ordering  of the orthogonal- 
ization  always  places output  first,  the output  price  index second, the fed- 
eral  funds rate  third,  and the financial  price or quantity  last. Hence any 
effects attributed  to monetary  policy shocks are due entirely to those 
movements  in the federal  funds rate that are not predictable  from past 
output  and inflation,  and any effects attributed  to the financial  price or 
quantity  per se are due entirely  to that part  of its variation  not predict- 
able from  past output, inflation,  or funds rate movements. Each vector 
autoregression  considered  is estimated  using quarterly  data  for 1960:1- 
1992:4,  with four  lags on each variable  included.49 
Figure  5 presents  three impulse  responses for each such system, de- 
signed  to answer  the following  three questions. First, do monetary  pol- 
icy shocks affect  real  output?  Second, do monetary  policy shocks affect 
the specific financial  price or quantity  indicated?  And third, does that 
financial  variable  affect real  output  independently,  in the sense of doing 
more  than  just reflecting  whatever  effect monetary  policy is having? 
As the left-most  column  of panels  in figure  5 shows, the answer  to the 
first question is clearly yes. No matter  what financial  price or quantity 
the system includes, a positive shock to the federal funds rate always 
depresses real  output.  Moreover,  these estimated  effects are significant 
not only statistically  but also economically.  In the case of the first  panel 
shown, for example, a one percentage  point increase in the funds rate 
(again,  independent  of what  past real  output  and  inflation  would  predict) 
depresses the level of  real output by about 0.75 percent after six 
quarters.50 
49. To use data  from  the entire 1960-92  sample  for this purpose  is to ignore  the many 
changes  in market  structures,  business  practices,  and  government  policies  that  have  taken 
place  during  this period.  Which  if any such changes  have amounted  to a structural  break 
in the  context  of the models  estimated  here  is an interesting  question,  but  one that  lies well 
beyond  the scope of this  paper.  See Akhtar  and  Harris  (1987),  Bosworth  (1989),  Friedman 
(1989),  and Mauskopf  (1990),  for example, for analyses along those lines in the specific 
context  of monetary  policy. 
50. Not surprisingly,  this  effect is more  muted  in samples  restricted  to the period  after 
Regulation  Q interest  ceilings  ceased to be effective. For example,  in the 1975-92  sample 
used  in the seventh  section  to investigate  the most  recent  experience,  a 1  percentage  point 
increase  in the  federal  funds  rate  depresses  real  output  by 0.33 percent  after  eight  quarters. ':  Sa  I\_S  z 
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The first  system  for which  impulse  responses  are shown  in figure  5, in 
the top row, includes  the paper-bill  spread  as the fourth  variable.  As the 
middle  panel  in that  row shows, the paper-bill  spread  rises immediately 
and  sharply  in response  to a contractionary  monetary  policy shock,  just 
along  the lines of the discussion  of monetary  policy shocks in the fourth 
section;  hence there  is strong  ground  for  interpreting  the spread  as a kind 
of monetary  policy  indicator,  as Bernanke;  Kashyap,  Stein, and  Wilcox; 
and we in our previous  work have all suggested. In addition,  however, 
as the right-most  panel in that row shows, fully orthogonalized  shocks 
to the paper-bill  spread  also depress real output  in the short  run. Hence 
either the paper-bill  spread is capturing  aspects of monetary policy 
shocks not reflected  in the federal  funds  rate, or the spread  contains  in- 
formation about effects on real activity due to  shocks from other 
sources. (Either  implication  is interesting  in a monetary  policy context.) 
In the next system considered, the financial  variable  included  is the 
spread  between the bank loan rate and the commercial  paper rate-in 
principle,  the key relative  price  that motivates  the financing  behavior  of 
firms, and hence the resulting  effects on real output, in the model of 
Kashyap,  Stein, and  Wilcox. Although  negative  monetary  policy shocks 
do widen the loan-paper  spread, as the Kashyap-Stein-Wilcox  model 
predicts,  they do so only after  a sharp  initial  contrary  movement  that is 
presumably  due to banks' sluggishness  in adjusting  their loan rates.5' 
The seemingly  counterintuitive  finding  that  fully orthogonalized  shocks 
to the loan-paper  spread  independently  stimulate  real output  (albeit  not 
significantly)  is probably  a reflection  of this initial  contrary  movement 
as well. 
The next three systems considered  in figure  5 bear on questions of 
business  financing  in the sense of equation  6 above. First,  as is suggested 
in the discussion in the fourth  section (and  also in the analysis  of Kash- 
yap, Stein, and  Wilcox), a contractionary  monetary  policy shock causes 
the volume  of commercial  paper  outstanding  to increase. In addition,  as 
is consistent with the discussion of either bank capital shocks or busi- 
ness cash flow shocks in the fourth  section, whatever  shock apart  from 
monetary  policy is causing commercial  paper volume to increase also 
independently  depresses output. Second, in contrast  to the analysis of 
51. This  delay  could  explain  part  of the timing  pattern  observed  by Romer  and  Romer 
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Kashyap,  Stein, and Wilcox (and  the discussion accompanying  figure  2 
above), negative  monetary  policy shocks cause bank  loan volume to in- 
crease. The independent  effect on output due to fully orthogonalized 
shocks to loan volume  is expansionary,  however, as anticipated.  Third, 
negative  monetary  policy shocks do cause firms  to draw  down their  liq- 
uid  assets, as described  in the fourth  section, and  whatever  other  shocks 
cause firms  to raise  their  liquid  asset holdings  (positive  cash flow shocks, 
for example)  independently  stimulate  real  output. 
The final two systems considered in figure  5 focus on questions of 
bank  portfolio  behavior  in the sense of equation  9. As the discussion of 
reserve  requirements  in the third  and  fourth  sections suggests, negative 
monetary  policy shocks lead  banks  to increase  their  outstanding  volume 
of nonreservable  certificates  of deposit.52  Independent  shocks to CD 
volume are expansionary  for real output, however, as would be ex- 
pected. Negative monetary  policy shocks  also lead  banks  to reduce  their 
holdings  of government  securities  (roughly  mirroring  the movements  of 
the opposite direction  in their loan portfolios, shown above). Surpris- 
ingly, however-at  least in the context of the discussion of capital re- 
quirements and associated shocks  in  the  fourth section-positive 
shocks to banks' securities  holdings  from sources other than monetary 
policy stimulate  real  output. 
Bank Capital Shocks 
Measuring  the adequacy  of banks' capital  adequacy  in a time-series 
context is problematic  for two reasons. First, what matters  for banks' 
portfolio  decisions, as in equation  9, is not only how much  capital  banks 
hold but how much they hold compared  to required  benchmarks  that 
have changed substantially  over time. Before 1981,  bank regulators  in 
the United States imposed a largely  discretionary  system of capital  re- 
quirements  based on case-by-case  comparisons  with similar  banks. Be- 
tween 1981  and 1985,  the regulators  phased in a uniform  minimum  re- 
quirement  of 5.5 percent of assets for "primary  capital"  consisting of 
equity  plus loan loss reserves. Beginning  in 1989,  a new system required 
52. Not surprisingly,  this effect is stronger  in post-Regulation  Q samples  (see again 
footnote  50). In the 1975-92  sample,  the maximum  effect on CD issuance  is 1.8 percent 
and  highly  significant,  in contrast  to the marginally  significant  1.2  percent  at the maximum 
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a minimum  ratio  to assets of 3-5 percent,  depending  on portfolio  compo- 
sition and expected future  growth, for "tier-I  capital,"  which excludes 
loan loss reserves and  a portion  of preferred  equity.53  In 1992,  the Basle 
guidelines  further  mandated  minimum  requirements  of 4 percent  for  tier- 
1 capital and 8 percent for tier-2 capital, based not on total assets but 
"risk-adjusted"  assets. 
The second difficulty  in measuring  banks'  capital  adequacy  is that, as 
the discussion  in the third  section emphasizes,  what matters  is not only 
the amount  of capital  that banks in the aggregate  hold but the distribu- 
tion of those holdings  across individual  banks. Apart  from  mergers  and 
acqusitions, which are typically slow-moving and laborious transac- 
tions, there is no market  through  which a bank  with excess capital  can 
transfer  that excess to another  bank that is deficient. To the authors' 
best knowledge, there currently  exists no publicly available  source of 
time-series  data  compactly  summarizing  the adequacy  of banks'  capital 
in a way that  captures  this distributional  aspect.54 
In the absence of a measure  that  would  adequately  address  these two 
problems,  figure  6 presents  impulse  response  functions  summarizing  the 
behavior  of a series of vector autoregression  systems that  include  a sim- 
ple measure  of aggregate  U.S. bank  capital  holdings  based on the differ- 
ence between banks' aggregate  assets and liabilities,  divided  by aggre- 
gate bank  assets.55  The strong  and consistent effect of monetary  policy 
shocks, not only on output  but also on many of the financial  variables 
shown in figure  5, serves as a warning  against  proceeding  to investigate 
the effects of other  kinds  of shocks without  also including  monetary  pol- 
icy shocks in the analysis. Figure  6 therefore  shows impulse  responses 
drawn  from a series of five-variable  vector autoregressions  that are di- 
rectly analogous  to those underlying  figure  5, except that they also in- 
clude the logarithm  of the aggregate  bank  capital  ratio.  The order  of or- 
53. Again,  see Baer  and  McElravey  (1993)  for  a comprehensive  review. 
54. In separate  research,  the authors  are currently  constructing  such a measure  by 
applying  the cross-sectional  regression  approach  of Baer  and  McElravey  (1993)  to the full 
set of individual-bank  call report  data  available  for each quarter  since 1976. 
55. Data  are drawn  from  a survey  of weekly reporting  banks  and  from  quarterly  call 
reports,  as reported  in the Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  table 1.25, various  issues. The rele- 
vant  series  are  available  on a consistent  basis  beginning  in 1973:1  and  ending  (as  of the time 
of writing)  in 1992:2.  The difference  between  assets and  liabilities  is not  identical  to equity 
capital  as defined  in the call reports,  but it is conceptually  similar  and  it is also quantita- 
tively similar  to the aggregate  equity  capital  from  the call reports  as given in Federal  Re- 
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thogonalization in  each  system  is  output first,  inflation second, 
monetary  policy (the federal  funds rate) third, the capital  ratio fourth, 
and whatever specific financial  price or quantity  the system includes 
fifth. Each vector autoregression  considered is estimated using quar- 
terly  data  for 1974:1-1992:2,  with three  lags on each variable  included. 
Because these systems show little evidence that shocks to bank  capi- 
tal independently  affect output, figure  6 shows only the effects of bank 
capital  shocks on specific  financial  prices  and  quantities  and  the fully or- 
thogonalized  effects of those prices and quantities  on output (corres- 
ponding  to the impulse responses shown in the middle  and right-hand 
portions  of figure  5). When the system's fifth variable  is the paper-bill 
spread, the effect of a negative bank capital shock is to widen that 
spread,  as the discussion in the fourth  section predicts,  but the effect is 
not statistically  significant.  By contrast,  the negative  effect on the loan- 
paper  spread  is directly  inconsistent  with  what  the analysis  of bank  capi- 
tal shocks in the fourth  section implies.  Here each spread  has significant 
predictive power with respect to real output, even with the spread 
placed after the federal  funds rate and the bank capital  ratio in the or- 
thogonalization. 
Negative shocks to bank capital lead to an initial small decline but 
then, as the discussion  in the fourth  section predicts,  an increase  in non- 
financial  firms'  issuance  of commercial  paper.  What  is strikingly  at odds 
with  the discussion  in the fourth  section, however, is that  negative  bank 
capital  shocks lead to an increase in bank  lending.  This result presum- 
ably reflects the inadequacy  of the simple capital-to-asset  ratio as dis- 
cussed above. (Bank  loans are a major  component  of bank  assets.) The 
finding  that  negative  bank  capital  shocks mostly cause firms  to increase 
their  holdings  of liquid  assets is also inconsistent  with the discussion in 
the fourth section. The positive effect on banks' CD issuance and the 
negative  effect on banks' holdings  of government  securities  are not di- 
rectly  inconsistent  with  a role  for bank  capital  shocks as described  in the 
fourth  section, but they may also be due to the simultaneity  problem  in- 
herent  in using  the capital-to-assets  ratio  in this context. 
Default Risk Shocks 
Figures  7 and  8 present  results  bearing  on the default  risk  hypothesis, 
as described  in the fourth  section, by showing  impulse  responses  from  a 
further  series of five-variable  vector autoregressions  that  are analogous 242  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 6.  Dynamic Effects of Negative Capital-Assets Shocks' 
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to those underlying  figure  6, except that the variable  that is included  in 
the autoregression  and  ordered  fourth  in the orthogonalization  is not the 
bank capital  ratio but the spread  between the respective interest rates 
on commercial  paper rated P2 and P1 (the second-highest  and highest 
ratings, respectively) by Moody's Investors Service. Here the sample 
used to estimate  each autoregression  is 1975:1-1992:4.  The autoregres- 
sion includes  three  lags on each variable. 
Figure  7 plots three  impulse  responses  that  are similar  in all  these sys- 
tems, regardless  of which  financial  price  or quantity  is the fifth  variable, 
showing  as an example  the specific  results  only from  the system that  in- 
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Figure 6.  (continued) 
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Source: See figure  5. 
a. These figures  show impulse  responses  from  five-variable  vector  autoregressions.  Each system consists of the 
four variables  used in figure 5,  and the logarithm  of the aggregate  bank capital ratio (ordered  fourth in the 
orthogonalization),  defined as the difference  between banks' aggregate  assets and liabilities  divided by banks' 
aggregate  assets. Each VAR uses quarterly  data  from 1974:1-1992:2,  with three  lags on each variable.  The dashed 
lines depict  the one standard  error  band  around  the impulse  response. 
b. For the federal  funds  innovations  and  the interest  rate-spread  innovations,  the units  are percentage  points. 
press real output in the presence of the P2-PI spread,  just as was the 
case in figure  5 based on the four-variable  systems. Second, negative 
monetary  policy shocks also cause the P2-P  1 risk spread  to widen (pre- 
sumably  because a weakening  of real economic activity makes  defaults 
more  likely). Third,  positive default  risk shocks-that  is, a widening  of 
the P2-PI spread  that is not predictable  from real output, inflation,  or 
monetary  policy-at  first  depress  output  but then, after  five or six quar- 
ters, are  followed  by a rise in output  (presumably  reflecting  the nonfina- 
cial economy's usual cyclical properties).  Although  figure  7 shows the 
specifics  for only one system, these three  responses  are  characteristic  of 
all of the five-variable  systems that include the P2-P1 spread as the 
fourth  variable. Figure 7.  Dynamics of Monetary Policy, Positive Risk Shocks, and Outputa 
Percent 
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Source:  See  figure 5. 
a.  These  figures show  the impulse  responses  from a five-variable  vector  autoregression.  The  system  consists  of 
the four variables used in the first row of figure 5, and a fifth variable (ordered fourth in orthogonalization),  defined 
as the spread between  the interest  rates on P2-rated and P1-rated commercial  paper. The  VARs  use  quarterly data 
from  1975:1-1992:4,  with three lags on each  variable.  The dashed  lines depict  the one  standard error band around 
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As figure  8 shows, when the system's fifth variable  is the paper-bill 
spread, the effect of a positive default risk shock is at first slightly to 
widen the paper-bill  spread  but then, surprisingly,  to narrow  it. This re- 
sponse is directly inconsistent  with the account of the default risk hy- 
pothesis given in the fourth  section. It is interesting,  however, that the 
predictive  power  of the paper-bill  spread  with respect  to real  output  dis- 
appears  when, as here, shocks to that spread  are orthogonalized  with 
respect to both monetary  policy and default  risk. Positive default risk 
shocks  briefly  widen  the loan-paper  spread,  after  an initial  delay, but  this 
response by itself neither supports  nor refutes an empirically  relevant 
role for default  risk shocks as described  in the fourth  section. 
The results in terms of financial  quantities  are generally  more sup- 
portive  of a role for default  risk shocks. After an initial  delay, positive 
default  risk  shocks reduce  the outstanding  volume  of commercial  paper, 
and they reduce the volume of bank  loans right  away. They also cause 
firms to build up their holdings of liquid assets. Positive default risk 
shocks also cause banks  to cut back on their  issuance of CDs and to fa- 
vor government  securities  in their  asset portfolios. 
Cash Flow  Shocks 
As is clear from equations  5 and 6, what firms  need to finance  is the 
gap between their investment  and their net revenues. Either  a positive 
shock to investment  (in unintended  inventories,  for example)  or a nega- 
tive shock to net revenues creates a greater  need for financing.  Figures 
9-11 provide  evidence on the cash flow shocks hypothesis  of the fourth 
section  by presenting  results  that  are  analogous  to those shown  in figures 
7 and  8, except that  here the variable  that  is included  in the vector auto- 
regression  and ordered  fourth  in the orthogonalization  is either inven- 
tory accumulation  or corporate earnings. Here the sample used is 
1960:1-1992:4,  and the  autoregressions include four lags on  each 
variable. 
When  the measure  of cash flow shocks is inventory  accumulation,  the 
results  of these investigations  are mostly supportive  of an empirical  role 
for cash flow shocks as described in the fourth section. As the upper 
panels of figure  9 show, using the system with the paper-bill  spread  to 
illustrate  a result  that  appears  in all of these systems, negative  monetary 
policy shocks (again  represented  by the federal funds rate) at first in- 246  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 8.  Dynamics of Positive Risk Shocks, Financial Variables, and Outputa 
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crease but then depress firms' inventory holdings, while positive inven- 
tory  shocks  (orthogonalized  with  respect  to  output,  inflation,  and  the 
federal  funds  rate)  depress  subsequent  real output.  As  figure  10 shows, 
positive  inventory  shocks  initially  widen  the  paper-bill  spread  and  in- 
crease  the  volume  of  commercial  paper,  and  lead  firms  to  reduce  their 
liquid  asset  holdings,  all as predicted  in the fourth  section.  Interestingly, 
bank  loan  volume  at first does  not  respond  when  there  is a positive  in- 
ventory  shock,  and  then  declines  (perhaps  because  investment  itself 
subsequently declines).  It is also interesting that most of these financial 
price and quantity variables retain their predictive power with respect 
to output, even  when they are placed after both the federal funds rate 
and inventory movements  in the orthogonalization.  Banks' CD volume Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  247 
Figure 8.  (continued) 
Percent,  except as noted in footnote b 
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a.  These  figures show  the impulse responses  from five-variable  vector  autoregressions.  Each  system  consists  of 
the four variables  used in figure 5,  and a fifth variable (ordered fourth in orthogonalization),  defined as the  spread 
between  the interest rates on P2-rated and P1-rated commercial  paper. The VARs  use  quarterly data from  1975:1- 
1992:4, with three lags on each  variable.  The  dashed  lines  depict  the one  standard error band around the  impulse 
response. 
b.  For the federal funds innovations  and the interest rate-spread innovations,  the units are percentage points. 
does not respond significantly to inventory shocks,  but banks' holdings 
of government securities decline. 
As the lower panels of figure 9 illustrate, again using as an example 
the system  including the paper-bill spread,  negative  monetary  policy 
shocks depress firms' earnings, while independent earnings shocks de- 
press subsequent output but not significantly. As figure 11 shows,  both 
the paper-bill spread and the loan-paper spread at first widen (as pre- 
dicted) and then narrow when a negative  earnings shock  occurs,  and 
commercial paper volume increases  (also as predicted) for three quar- 
ters. Surprisingly, negative earnings shocks cause bank loan volume to 
decrease.  As expected,  in the face of negative earnings shocks, firms re- 
duce their holdings of liquid assets.  Banks' reduced CD issuance is con- 248  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 9.  Negative Monetary Policy Shocks, Negative Cash Flow Shocks, and Outputa 
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a.  These  figures show  the impulse  responses  from a five-variable  vector  autoregression.  The  system  consists  of 
the four variables used in the first row of figure 5, and a fifth variable (ordered fourth in orthogonalization),  defined 
as either inventory accumulation or corporate earnings. The VARs use quarterly data from 1960:1-1992:4, with four 
lags on each variable. The dashed lines depict the one  standard error band around the impulse response. 
b.  For earnings and inventories  the units are a percentage of the lagged total of loans and paper. 
sistent with the reduced  need to fund  in lending,  and there  is also an ini- 
tial (mostly not significant)  decrease in banks' government  securities 
holdings. 
Overview 
Several  broad  conclusions  emerge  from  this inspection  of descriptive 
results  on financial  market  behavior  and  real  output  changes  in response 
to specific kinds  of shocks. First, the evidence is broadly  supportive  of Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  249 
an empirical  role for monetary  policy shocks not only in affecting  real 
output (that much is well known already) but also in accounting  for 
movements  of financial  variables  like the paper-bill  spread  and the vol- 
ume  of commercial  paper  that systematically  vary  in anticipation  of real 
output  fluctuations.  Other  aspects of these descriptive  results are also 
consistent  with what  the model  developed  in the second section implies 
about  how the financial  markets  respond  to monetary  shocks. Even so, 
these results  do not support  the view that  the role of the paper-bill  spread 
as a monetary  policy indicator  accounts  for the entirety  of its predictive 
content  with respect to real output. 
Second, these exercises provide little evidence to support  a role for 
shocks to bank  capital  positions in accounting  for the comovements of 
financial  prices and quantities,  and of nonfinancial  economic activity, 
that  are under  study here. As the discussion above indicates, however, 
this negative  finding  may simply  be due to the absence of a satisfactory 
time series that  not only measures  aggregate  bank  capital  in comparison 
to changing  capital requirements  but also reflects the distribution  of 
banks'  capital  within  the aggregate. 
Third,  the evidence is broadly  supportive  of an empirical  role for de- 
fault  risk  shocks  in explaining  observed  comovements  between  financial 
prices and  quantities  and  nonfinancial  activity. 
Fourth,  the evidence is also broadly  consistent  with an empirical  role 
for cash flow shocks in explaining  these comovements, especially when 
the measure  of such shocks is firms'  inventory  accumulation,  but also 
when the measure  used is firms'  earnings. 
Finally, as is the case for the much simpler  exercises reported  in the 
second section, which  are informative  but  have no interpretation  of spe- 
cific shocks in the context of a behavioral  model, the results presented 
here warn  against  relying  heavily on bank-centered  variables  (most ob- 
viously, loan rates  and  loan volumes)  or narrowly  bank-centered  expla- 
nations  to capture  relationships  between the financial  markets  and non- 
financial  economic activity. In part  this may be due to the well-known 
inability  to measure  loan interest  rates accurately.  But the evidence as- 
sembed  here, viewed as a whole, also strongly  suggests  that  other  short- 
term credit markets like the commercial  paper market  play a role in 
these financial-nonfinancial  relationships  that is worth bringing  explic- 
itly into the analysis. 250  Brookings Painers on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 10.  Positive Inventory Shocks, Financial Variables, and Outputa 
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Structural Estimates of Key Relationships 
Estimating  an all-inclusive  empirical  counterpart  to the model devel- 
oped in the third  section, with all relevant  simultaneities  taken into ac- 
count, is a task that  clearly  lies beyond  the scope of this paper.  Even so, 
it is useful  at least to examine  on a one-by-one  basis structural  estimates 
of several of the relationships  in equations  6, 9, and 12  that are particu- 
larly central  to the analysis of the different  kinds of shocks considered 
in the fourth  and  fifth  sections. The question  at issue is whether  there  is 
empirical  support  for assuming  that these shocks cause specific  behav- 
ioral  relationships  to shift  in the way illustrated  in figures  2, 3, and  4. Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N.  Kiuttner  251 
Figure 10.  (continued) 
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Source: See figure  5. 
a. These figures  show the impulse  responses  from  five-variable  vector  autoregressions.  Each  system  consists  of 
the four  variables  used  in figure  5, and  a fifth  variable  (ordered  fourth  in orthogonalization),  inventory  accumulation. 
The VARs use quarterly  data  from 1960:1-1992:4,  with four  lags on each variable.  The dashed  lines depict  the one 
standard  error  band  around  the impulse  response. 
b. For the federal  funds  innovations  and  the interest  rate-spread  innovations,  the units  are percentage  points,  and 
for inventories  the units  are a percentage  of the lagged  total  of loans  and paper. 
Table  5 presents  estimates  of  four  portfolio  relationships  that  play 
pivotal  roles  in the  model's  story  of  how  different  shocks  affect  the  fi- 
nancial  markets  and,  through  the  resulting  financial  price  and  quantity 
effects,  nonfinancial  economic  activity.  Each  equation  is  individually 
estimated  twice,  once  by  ordinary  least  squares  and  once  by  two-stage 
least  squares,  with  quantities  AP and  AL and prices  rp, rL, and  rB taken 
to be  endogenous.56  The  set  of  instruments  used  for  the  two-stage  esti- 
56. Because  each equation  is individually  estimated,  the estimates  are not as efficient 
as they  would  be if the  four  equations  were  estimated  jointly  as a single  system.  In  addition, 
because  only four  equations  are  estimated,  instead  of the ten included  altogether  in equa- 
tions  6, 9, and 12, these estimates  do not exploit  the relevant  cross-equation  restrictions. 252  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 11.  Negative Earnings Shocks, Financial Variables, and Outputa 
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mation  includes all exogenous variables  that appear  in any of the four 
equations,  together  with  all endogenous  variables  (or  transformations  of 
endogenous variables)  that appear  as lagged variables. Estimates are 
based on quarterly  data for 1975:1-1992:4.  In addition  to the variables 
indicated  in the table, each equation also includes a constant, a time 
trend, and two dummy variables  to allow for the imposition  of credit 
controls in 1980:2  and the tax code change at 1986:4-1987:  1. The num- 
bers shown in parentheses  below the estimated  coefficients  are the cor- 
responding  t-statistics  corrected  for heteroskedasticity  and for fourth- 
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Figure 11.  (continued) 
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Source: See figure  5. 
a. These figures  show the impulse  responses  from  five-variable  vector  autoregressions.  Each system consists of 
the four  variables  used in figure  5, and  a fifth  variable  (ordered  fourth  in orthogonalization),  corporate  earnings.  The 
VARs use quarterly  data from 1960:1-1992:4,  with four lags on each variable.  The dashed lines depict the one 
standard  error  band  around  the impulse  response. 
b. For the federal  funds  innovations  and  the interest  rate-spread  innovations,  the units  are percentage  points,  and 
for earnings  the units  are a percentage  of the lagged  total  of loans  and paper. 
Firms'  Financing 
The first  two regressions  in table  5 show results  for the change  in non- 
financial  firms'  outstanding  bank  loans, ALF, normalized  by dividing  by 
the lagged  outstanding  stock of loans plus commercial  paper.  The esti- 
mated coefficients are, with only one exception, in line with the pre- 
sumptions  indicated  in the third  section and reflected  in the discussion 
in the fourth  section. In terms  of price  effects, a wider  loan-paper  spread 
reduces  firms'  bank  borrowing.  Including  the commercial  paper  rate in- 
dependently  of the spread  shows that while the respective coefficients en 
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on the loan  rate  and  the paper  rate  are  of opposite  sign, they are  not equal 
in magnitude.  In terms  of quantity  flow effects (normalized  analogously 
to the dependent variable),  greater inventory accumulation  increases 
firms'  bank  borrowing  as in figure  4, at the rate of nearly  fifty cents per 
dollar in the two-stage least squares estimate.57  In terms of quantity 
stock effects, a greater  share  of bank  loans in firms'  existing short-term 
liabilities  reduces their  incremental  bank  borrowing,  although  this esti- 
mated effect is only marginally  significant  even in the two-stage esti- 
mate.  The one exception  to the presumptions  of the third  and  fourth  sec- 
tions is that  greater  earnings  do not reduce  firms'  bank  borrowing.  (The 
point estimate for this coefficient is even positive, but it is not statisti- 
cally significant.)  The contrast  between inventories  and  earnings  in this 
regard  parallels  the differences  in the analysis of impulse  responses re- 
ported  in the fifth  section. 
The next two regressions show analogous  results for the change in 
nonfinancial  firms'  outstanding  commercial  paper, ApF,  again normal- 
ized by dividing  by the lagged  outstanding  stock of short-term  liabilities. 
In contrast  to the results shown above for bank  borrowing,  issuance of 
commercial  paper displays no discernible response to the loan-paper 
spread,  and the estimated  effect of the paper  rate has the "wrong"  sign. 
Even in the two-stage  procedure,  the estimation  has presumably  failed 
to identify  supply  versus  demand  in this respect.58  Greater  inventory  ac- 
cumulation  does increase  firms'  paper  issuance, by sixteen cents on the 
dollar.  Unlike the case of bank  loans, greater  earnings  reduce  firms'  pa- 
per issuance, by twenty-one cents on the dollar. The lagged balance 
sheet stock effect also has the expected sign, and the coefficient  is both 
statistically  and economically  significant. 
Bank  Lending 
The fifth  and sixth regressions  in table 5 show results  for the change 
in banks' outstanding  business loans.59  Comparison  to the first  two re- 
57. Allowing  for the joint determination  of firms'  inventory  accumulation  and bank 
borrowing  by treating  inventories  as endogenous  for purposes  of the two-stage  estimation 
further  raises  the estimated  coefficient  to 0.665. 
58. An alternative  explanation  is that  when  interest  rates  rise, firms'  financing  require- 
ments increase  for reasons not otherwise  captured  by the equation's  independent  vari- 
ables. 
59. Because  this equation  includes  the lagged  bank  capital  ratio, the sample  extends 
only through  1992:3  (again,  see footnote  55). 256  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
gressions  shows that,  in terms  of price  effects, even the two-stage  proce- 
dure has again failed to distinguish  demand and supply behavior. In 
other  respects, however, the results  are in line with the presumptions  of 
the third  and  fourth  sections. Expansionary  monetary  policy, here rep- 
resented  by a greater  level of nonborrowed  reserves relative  to total re- 
serves,60  leads  banks  to increase  their  lending  as in figure  2. Specifically, 
a 0.01 increase  in the nonborrowed  reserve ratio  (about  equivalent  to a 
half-billion-dollar  open market  operation  at 1993  levels) causes banks  to 
increase  their  loans by 0.24 percent  relative  to outstanding  liabilities  (or 
about  $7 billion  at 1993  levels) on an annualized  basis, although  this ef- 
fect appears  to take the form of a change effect. An increase in the de- 
fault risk associated with business obligations,  represented  by the P2- 
P1 spread,  reduces banks' lending  as in figure  3. An increase in banks' 
capital  adequacy,  again  represented  by the simple  aggregate  capital-to- 
assets ratio  used in the fifth  section  but  here  lagged  to avoid  at least some 
of the obvious simultaneity,  increases  banks'  lending.6'  The lagged  bal- 
ance sheet composition  also has the expected effect. 
Households'  Lending 
The last two regressions  in table 5 show results  for the change  in op- 
en-market  investors' holdings  of commercial  paper  plus certificates  of 
deposit. The demand  for commercial  paper  and  CDs depends  positively 
on the paper-bill  spread,  as expected, and  the magnitude  of this effect is 
greater  in the two-stage  estimate. Inclusion  of the paper  rate separately 
again  shows that  the respective  coefficients  on the paper  rate  and  the bill 
rate  are of opposite sign  but not equal  magnitude.  Greater  perceived  de- 
fault  risk, again  represented  by the P2-PI spread,  reduces  investors'  de- 
60. The ratio  of nonborrowed  reserves  to total  reserves-or,  equivalently,  one minus 
the borrowed  reserve  ratio-is  a standard  indicator  of monetary  policy  that  is usually  as- 
sumed  to be closely related  to the federal  funds  rate. Using  the  funds  rate  directly  to repre- 
sent monetary  policy shocks, as in the impulse response analysis in the fifth section, 
seemed to be a poor  idea here in light  of the presence  in the equation  of the loan  rate  and 
the paper  rate. 
61. This  result  is especially  noteworthy  in that  the simple  correlation  between  the ag- 
gregate  capital  ratio  and  bank  lending  is negative,  and  the impulse  response  for bank  lend- 
ing shown  in figure  6 also has the unexpected  sign. Benjamin M. Fr-iedman and Kenneth N.  Kuttner-  257 
mand  for paper  and  CDs as in figure  3.6  The balance  sheet stock variable 
also exhibits  the expected effect. 
Overview 
Overall,  the four sets of results shown in table 5 provide  further  sup- 
port  for thinking  about  the effects of different  kinds  of shocks along  the 
lines described  in the fourth  section. Not very surprisingly,  these esti- 
mated  relationships  do not always pin down price effects-that  is, the 
slopes of the curves drawn in figures 2-4. The equations describing 
firms'  financing  decisions, for example, suggest  that  bank  borrowing  re- 
sponds strongly to the relative cost of loans and commercial  paper, 
while paper  issuance does not. On the other side of the market,  invest- 
ors' demand  for commercial  paper bears the expected relationship  to 
relative  financial  prices, but banks'  lending  does not. By contrast,  these 
equations  do indicate  that  the kinds  of shocks hypothesized  in the fourth 
section to shift the curves in figures  2-4 actually do so, and that such 
shifts  are  both statistically  significant  and  of a magnitude  to be economi- 
cally relevant. Further,  here the relative magnitudes  are also informa- 
tive. For example, the respective  responses of firms'  commercial  paper 
issuance and  bank  borrowing  to changing  cash flows are not  just mirror 
images  of one another,  in that inventory  accumulation  dominates  bank 
borrowing  while earnings  fluctuations  play a greater role in paper is- 
suance. 
Analyzing the 1988-92 Credit Slowdown 
What  then caused the dramatic  slowdown in lending  that took place 
in the U.S. credit markets  during  1989-92?  And to what extent did the 
factors underlying  the credit slowdown play a role in bringing  on the 
1990-91  business  recession, or the unusually  sluggish  business  recovery 
that  has followed? 
62. One  way to gauge  intuitively  the magnitude  of the effect of greater  default  risk  is to 
renormalize  the  equation  so that  the paper-bill  spread  is the  dependent  variable  and  invest- 
ors' net  purchases  of commercial  paper  is an  (endogenous)  independent  variable.  Estimat- 
ing  the equation  in this inverted  form  indicates  that  a given widening  of the P2-PI spread 
widens  the paper-bill  spread  by an approximately  equal  magnitude. 258  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 12  illustrates  the unusual  character  of the recent slowdown  in 
short-term  business credit extensions by plotting  the quarterly  net in- 
crease in the two categories of lending that are the main focus of the 
model  in the third  section and  the empirical  investigations  in the fifth  and 
sixth sections: commercial  and industrial  loans at banks, and commer- 
cial paper  issued by nonfinancial  businesses (scaled in each case by di- 
viding  by the sum  of loans and  paper  outstanding  at the end of the previ- 
ous quarter).  Especially for commercial  and industrial  bank loans, the 
experience  from  late 1989  onward  was quite  extraordinary.  In the fifteen 
years before 1990,  bank loan contraction  was limited  to a few isolated 
quarters,  such as the credit control episode in 1980  and the time of the 
tax law change  at year-end  1986.63  By contrast,  the outstanding  volume 
of bank  loans shrank  steadily  throughout  1991-92.  Net issuance  of com- 
mercial  paper  was also negative  for a sustained  period  from  late 1990  to 
early 1992,  although  this phenomenon  does not represent  such a sharp 
contrast  with previous  experience. 
Figure 13 plots the independent  innovations,  from 1986-92, for the 
four variables  used above to represent  the different  shocks analyzed  in 
the fourth  section:  monetary  policy (the  federal  funds  rate);  bank  capital 
(the capital-to-assets  ratio);  default risk (the P2-P1 spread);  and busi- 
ness cash flows (inventory  accumulation).  Each series of innovations  is 
extracted from a distinct vector autoregression  system analogous to 
those described  in the fifth section. The federal  funds rate innovations 
are from a system including  output  growth, inflation,  the federal  funds 
rate, and bank  loans (normalized  by the lagged stock of loans plus pa- 
per),  orthogonalized  in that  order.  The capital  ratio  innovations  are  from 
the system including  output  growth,  inflation,  the federal  funds  rate, the 
capital ratio, and bank loans, orthogonalized  in that order. The P2-Pi 
spread innovations and the inventory innovations are from systems 
analogous  to that used for the bank  capital  innovations,  but with either 
the spread  or inventory  accumulation  used as the fourth  variable.  The 
sample  used to estimate  the underlying  autoregressions  is 1975:1-1992:4 
(1975:1-1992:2  in the case of the system including  the capital  ratio).  The 
dotted lines plotted for each series indicate one standard  deviation 
bands. 
63. Commercial  and industrial  bank loans also contracted  during  the 1974-75 re- 
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Figure 12.  Commercial and Industrial Lending and Commercial Paper Issuance, 
1978:1-1992:3a 
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a. The dashed  lines are  four-quarter  moving  averages  of the respective  series. Nonfinancial  commercial  paper  and 
commercial  and industrial  loans are scaled  by the sum  of loans  and paper. Figure 13.  Estimates of Recent Shocks,  1986-92a 
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a.  The federal funds  rate innovations  are based  on a four-variable  VAR containing  output growth,  inflation, the 
federal funds  rate,  and bank loan growth  (scaled  by the  lagged  stock  of  loans  plus  paper), orthogonalized  in that 
order.  The  remaining three  sets  of  innovations  are  from  five-variable  VARs  expanded  to  include  the  additional 
variable being analyzed,  ordered between  the federal funds rate and loan growth in the orthogonalization.  The dashed 
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Given the response patterns  predicted  in the fourth  section and (to a 
greater  or lesser extent, depending  on the specific variable  in question) 
documented  empirically  in the fifth  and sixth sections, several  of the in- 
novation series shown in figure 13 constitute potentially contributing 
factors behind  the slowdown in bank  lending. Monetary  policy shocks 
were mostly positive (that is, contractionary)  during  this period, albeit 
also mostly small  except in early 1987.  Bank  capital  shocks were sharply 
negative  in 1987  and again  in late 1989,  but sharply  positive in between 
(and  also at the end of 1992).  Default  risk  shocks were very sharply  posi- 
tive in late 1990.  Inventory  shocks varied  substantially,  but  never much 
exceeded one standard  deviation. 
Figure 14 plots the cumulative  effect on outstanding  bank loans at- 
tributable  to each of these four series of innovations.' Because each in- 
novation  from  figure  13  and  therefore  each cumulative  effect shown  here 
is based on a separate  autoregression  system, it is not legitimate  to "add 
up"  these effects as if they were consistently  estimated  components  of a 
unified  explanation  of the lending slowdown. Nonetheless, the results 
are at least intuitively  informative.  Especially  for 1991-92,  the period  of 
sharpest  decline in outstanding  loans (again,  see figure  13),  these results 
point to bank  capital  shocks, default  risk shocks, and cash flow shocks 
as all having  played a noticeable  role. By contrast, the effect of mone- 
tary  policy shocks was to increase  bank  lending  throughout  this period. 
Figure 15  plots the cumulative  effect on output  growth  attributable  to 
the same four series of innovations. Here monetary  policy shocks do 
play a major  role in accounting  for the generally  slow growth  of real  out- 
put beginning  in 1989.  Default  risk shocks are also especially important 
during  the recession that, according  to the official NBER chronology, 
began in July 1990  and ended in March 1991.  It is interesting  that bank 
capital  shocks, which did play a role in the 1990-92  credit  slowdown as 
shown in figure  14, had no discernible  independent  effect on real  output 
throughout  this period.65  Nor did inventory  accumulation. 
Repeating  this set of exercises with  the focus on commercial  paper  in 
64. The computation  takes  account  of the entire  past  history  of each  innovation  (since 
1975:1),  not  just the series  beginning  in 1986:1. 
65. See again,  however,  the discussion  in the  fifth  section  of the inadequacy  of the sim- 
ple  capital-to-assets  ratio  for purposes  of this  paper.  The  more  satisfactory  time  series  that 
the  authors  are  constructing  from  the call  report  data,  using  the method  of Baer  and  McEl- 
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a.  Plots  the cumulative  effect  on  commercial  and industrial loan growth  attributable to each  of  the innovations 
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a. Plots the cumulative  effect on real  GDP  growth  attributable  to each of the innovations  described  in figure  13. 
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place of bank  loans yields broadly  similar  results.66  The most interesting 
difference  is that  when  the autoregression  system's final  variable  is com- 
mercial  paper,  the estimated  effect on real  output  attributable  to default 
risk  shocks is even greater  than  shown  in figure  15.  In the trough  quarter 
of the recession, for example, the contribution  of default  risk to the an- 
nualized  growth rate of real output is - 4.5 percent, rather  than - 3.3 
percent  as shown in the second panel  of figure  15. 
Summary of Empirical Conclusions 
The overall  goal of this paper  is to move the focus of the rapidly  grow- 
ing credit  view analysis  of financial-nonfinancial  interactions,  and  espe- 
cially the empirical  aspects of that analysis, toward  a perspective that 
explicitly  incorporates  both  financial  prices  and  financial  quantities.  The 
model of the short-term  credit markets  provided  here shows how both 
financial  prices and financial  quantities  can bear on nonfinancial  eco- 
nomic activity. It also shows that at least the qualitative  aspects of ob- 
served relationships  among financial  prices, financial  quantities, and 
real activity can be explained  in a fairly straightforward  way, once the 
conceptual  framework  used for the analysis is broad  enough  to encom- 
pass the relevant  credit  market  pnenomena. 
Because a key element  of this model  (nonprice  costs of borrowing)  is 
not readily  observable,  and also because the task would lie beyond the 
scope of this paper  in any case, the empirical  analysis here stops short 
of estimating  a fully specified version of the model that stands behind 
the paper's  qualitative  analysis. Even so, the several levels of empirical 
investigation  carried  out in the paper-single-equation estimation, ex- 
amination  of impulse  responses  from  estimated  vector autoregressions, 
and simultaneous-equation  estimation of specific structural  relation- 
ships-lead  to specific  findings  that,  for the most part,  reinforce  one an- 
other. 
First, financial  price variables  and financial  quantity  variables  both 
have predictive power with respect to real economic activity. More- 
over, the predictive  content of financial  prices and financial  quantities, 
respectively, is not identical.  These two dimensions  of what is happen- 
66. These results, in a form  comparable  to figures  13-15, are not shown here but are 
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ing  in the credit  markets  contain  at least partly  independent  information 
about subsequent  fluctuations  of real output. Among financial  prices, 
much of that information  is contained  in relative interest rate relation- 
ships  like the paper-bill  spread  or the P2-P  1 quality  spread. 
Second, monetary  policy plays an important  role in affecting  both  the 
credit markets and nonfinancial  economic activity. Monetary policy 
shocks systematically  shift behavioral  relationships  that are central  to 
financial  effects on nonfinancial  activity. They also account for part of 
the predictive  power of financial  price and quantity  variables  with re- 
spect to real output. Variables  like the paper-bill  spread  also have pre- 
dictive  content  with respect  to real  output  that  is beyond  what  can read- 
ily be ascribed  to their  role  as indicators  of monetary  policy, however. In 
the most recent experience in the United States, tight monetary  policy 
appears  to have been important  in accounting  for the slow growth  of real 
output,  but not the slowdown  in credit  per se. 
Third, shocks to banks' capital positions also appear to have sig- 
nificant effects on financial variables (including in the recent credit 
slowdown),  albeit not discernibly  beyond the financial  markets.  An im- 
portant  limitation  here, however, stems from  the conceptual  shortcom- 
ings of the time series used in this paper as a measure  of capital ade- 
quacy. 
Fourth,  changing  perceptions  of the risk  of default  on business  liabili- 
ties also systematically  shift  the behavior  of lenders  in the credit  market, 
and these shifts in turn affect key financial  quantity  variables  like the 
volumes of financing  done in various  short-term  markets.  The evidence 
also suggests that these shifts in turn importantly  affect both financial 
price relationships  and nonfinancial  activity. In the most recent experi- 
ence, an increase in perceived default  risk appears  to have been an im- 
portant  factor  underlying  the credit  slowdown  as well as the business  re- 
cession. 
Fifth, effects arising from business firms' nonfinancial  activities- 
their inventory  accumulation  and their operating  earnings-shift  their 
financing  behavior,  and  these shifts  also affect  both  prices  and  quantities 
in the short-term  credit markets. Firms' inventories and earnings  not 
only respond to monetary  policy, and hence act as a vehicle for con- 
veying the effect of monetary  policy shocks to the demand  side of the 
short-term  credit  markets,  but also have effects on these markets  inde- 
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Finally,  a consistent  result  running  throughout  this paper's  empirical 
analysis  is that  the observed  movements  of either  price  or quantity  vari- 
ables defined specifically  with respect to the banking  system (interest 
rate  spreads  involving  the bank  loan rate, for example, or in some cases 
the volume of bank  lending)  bear a weaker  correspondence  to prior  ex- 
pectations  than do the movements  of analogous  variables  defined  with 
respect  to the credit  markets  more  broadly  (for  example,  spreads  involv- 
ing the commercial  paper  rate, or the volume  of commercial  paper  issu- 
ance). This finding  is certainly  not inconsistent  with a credit view per- 
spective, but it does caution  against  centering  any credit view analysis 
narrowly  on the role of the banking  system. Comments 
and Discussion 
Ben S. Bernanke: Benjamin  Friedman  and Kenneth  Kuttner  have done 
a nice  job of bringing  together  a number  of ideas and  pieces of evidence 
from the recent literature  on the role of short-term  credit markets in 
macroeconomics.  The identification  of structural  relationships  in this 
area is notoriously  difficult,  and this paper  does not provide  the defini- 
tive solution  to the identification  problem.  Nevertheless, I find the au- 
thors' interpretations  of the evidence to be coherent  and  generally  quite 
plausible.  In my comments  I will first  briefly  discuss the paper's  theoret- 
ical model, with an eye toward  placing  it in the context of the existing 
literature.  I will then list and  discuss what I consider  to be the main  em- 
pirical  findings. 
Friedman  and Kuttner  begin their paper with a useful taxonomy of 
classical, neoclassical, and credit-based  models.' To locate their own 
model  within  their  taxonomy,  I introduce  a concept known  as the Brain- 
ard number.2  The Brainard  number  of a theory or model is the number 
of imperfectly  substitutable  financial  assets that are assumed to exist. 
For example, in classical Arrow-Debreu-type  models, all financial 
assets are implicitly  perfect substitutes  (given the state-contingent  pat- 
tern of payouts); thus the Brainard  number  is one. The conventional 
IS-LM  model  (an  example  of what  Friedman  and Kuttner  call a neoclas- 
sical model) has two  imperfectly substitutable assets-money  and 
bonds-and  thus has a Brainard  number  of two. 
1. I have one small  quibble.  The authors  seem to identify  credit  models  of monetary 
policy with the bank  lending  channel  of monetary  policy discussed by other analysts- 
including  Alan Blinder  and me in our 1988  work. But the credit  view admits  nonstandard 
channels  of monetary  policy other  than  that  operating  through  bank  lending,  such as the 
effects of changes  in interest  rates on borrower  cash flows and collateral  values. See, for 
example,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1993b). 
2. With  apologies  to James  Tobin. 
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An important  feature  of virtually  all macroeconomic  models  based  on 
the "credit  view"  is that  their  Brainard  number  exceeds two. For exam- 
ple, in our 1988  paper,  Alan Blinder  and I modified  the standard  IS-LM 
setup  to allow for three imperfectly  substitutable  assets: money, bonds 
(either  government  or corporate), and bank loans.' This modification 
permitted  us to analyze the macroeconomic  effects of phenomena  such 
as credit controls or bank capital shortages  and to examine the role of 
bank  lending  in monetary  policy transmission,  none of which is feasible 
in the two-asset  IS-LM  model. 
What  Friedman  and Kuttner  have done is to raise the Brainard  num- 
ber to five. (The five assets in their  model are money or bank  deposits, 
Treasury  bills, bank  loans, bank-issued  certificates  of deposit, and  com- 
mercial  paper.) The disadvantages  of adding  more assets are that the 
analysis  becomes more  cluttered  (much  of the theory  portion  of the pa- 
per  consists of writing  down the various  asset demand  and supply  equa- 
tions and  the balance  sheet constraints),  and  the theoretical  predictions 
are  sometimes  less sharp.  However, there  are  two important  advantages 
to adding  more assets. First, the expanded  model allows the authors  to 
analyze  the behavior  of some interesting  variables,  such as the commer- 
cial paper-Treasury  bill interest  spread  and the loan-commercial  paper 
"mix,"  about  which simpler  models have nothing  to say. 
The second important  advantage  of considering  a larger  number  of 
assets (and the associated asset prices) is that the identification  of the 
underlying  shocks is facilitated.  This point has been stressed in this lit- 
erature  before, most notably  by Anil K. Kashyap,  Jeremy  C. Stein, and 
David W. Wilcox, who used information  about  commercial  paper  issu- 
ance to distinguish  shocks to bank  loan supply  from  shocks to bank  loan 
demand.4  In a similar  vein, Cara  S. Lown and I used information  about 
bank  CD issuance and the CD-Treasury  bill rate spread  to distinguish 
monetary  shocks to bank  loan supply  from shocks to loan supply  origi- 
nating  from  bank  capital.'  The significant  contribution  of Friedman  and 
Kuttner's  paper  is to provide  a framework  for bringing  all this informa- 
tion together-both prices and quantities-thus tackling  the identifica- 
tion problem more systematically. This unified approach  represents 
definite  progress. 
The  principal  way in which  Friedman  and  Kuttner  exploit  their  identi- 
3. Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988). 
4.  Kashyap,  Stein,  and  Wilcox  (1993). 
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fication  restrictions  empirically  is through  VAR  analysis.  Although  their 
interpretations  are plausible  and represent  an improvement  over earlier 
work, I urge some caution  in the use of VARs in this way. (I say this as 
a frequent  user of these methods  myself.) One problem  is that the inter- 
pretation  of shocks to endogenous variables  is potentially  ambiguous; 
what is a "cash flow shock," anyway? Another is that the economic 
structure  is not likely to be stable  over long periods  (a particularly  rele- 
vant issue in the analysis of financial  markets).  For these reasons I ap- 
plaud  Friedman  and Kuttner's  attempts  to supplement  the VARs with 
analysis  of a particular  episode (the 1990-91  recession)  and  by structural 
estimation  (although  these estimates  are still rather  preliminary). 
To conclude the discussion of Friedman  and Kuttner's theoretical 
framework  we might ask, is this the ultimate credit-based  model? Or 
should  we try  to push  the Brainard  number  even higher?  My sense is that 
the main direction  for improvement  at this point is not in adding  more 
assets but in improving  the treatment  of stock variables  and stock-flow 
interactions.  Although  the authors recognize the importance  of stock 
variables  such as outstanding  quantities  of debt and  other  balance  sheet 
items, the  formal  model  is expressed  almost  entirely  in  terms  of flows. In- 
corporating  stock variables  into the analysis  will at some point  be neces- 
sary  to study  economic  dynamncs  from  the  perspective  of the  credit  view. 
On the empirical  side, I will focus my comments on three principal 
findings  of the paper. First, the commercial  paper-Treasury  bill rate 
spread  is a remarkably  good predictor  of future  economic activity. Sec- 
ond, the information  in Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox's "mix"  variable  is 
contained almost entirely in the rate of commercial paper issuance, 
rather  than in bank lending. Third, shocks to corporate  cash flows ap- 
pear to be an important  determinant  of prices and quantities  in short- 
term  credit  markets. 
The predictive  power of the commercial  paper-Treasury  bill spread 
is indeed  remarkable,  and  Friedman  and  Kuttner  deserve credit  for their 
earlier  work that brought  it to our attention. In my 1990  paper I com- 
pared this variable's ability to forecast nine measures of real activity 
with  a number  of other  interest  rates and  rate spreads  and  found  it to be 
an easy winner  (although  its forecasting  power deteriorates  somewhat 
after  1980).6  The CP-Treasury  spread  seems even to contain  information 
that  is not in the index of leading  indicators. 
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Why is this spread  so predictive?  In my paper  I argued  that the CP- 
Treasury  spread  is informative  partly because it reflects the stance of 
monetary  policy; the idea is that tight money constrains  bank lending 
and  forces firms  into the commercial  paper  market.  This hypothesis  has 
the virtue  of being  consistent  with  the failure  of the spread  to predict  the 
1990-91  recession (which was perhaps the only recession of the last 
thirty  years  not immediately  preceded  by a monetary  tightening).  Fried- 
man and Kuttner  provide support  for the monetary  policy hypothesis 
and  add  another  explanation,  that shocks to corporate  cash flow arising 
from sources other than monetary  policy both lead the cycle and move 
the spread.  There  is clearly something  to this explanation  (more  on this 
point  below), although  again  I would  like to know the ultimate  source of 
the shocks to cash flow. On a final potential explanation-that  the 
spread  is predictive  because it reflects the market's  assessment of de- 
fault risk-a  bit of disagreement  remains  between the authors  and me. 
Although  Friedman  and Kuttner  give the default  risk explanation  some 
credence,  I believe that  cyclical variation  in default  risk  contributes  little 
to the predictive  power of the spread.  Supporting  evidence for my view 
is that  default  rates  for the highest-rated  paper  are almost  zero, and  that 
the spread  is nearly  uncorrelated  with other  natural  measures  of default 
risk, such as the spread  between Baa and  Aaa corporate  bond rates.7 
Let me now consider the finding  that the information  in Kashyap, 
Stein, and Wilcox's "mix"  variable  is contained  entirely  in commercial 
paper  issuance. While  this finding  is correct as a statement  about  fore- 
casting, it is important  not to confuse predictive  power with structural 
significance.  In particular,  it would be premature  to conclude  from this 
result  that  bank  lending  does not play  a role in monetary  transmission  or 
in cyclical dynamics  more  generally.  The fact that  bank  lending  appears 
to be a lagging  variable  (due  perhaps  to factors  such as contractual  com- 
mitments)  does not undercut  Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox's point that 
commercial  paper  issuers appear  able to satisfy their  increased  demand 
for short-term  credit at the onset of a recession, while bank-dependent 
borrowers  cannot. Disaggregation  of bank  lending  by class of borrower 
strengthens  this point. Much  recent research  documents  that the share 
of bank loans going to the strongest borrowers  (for example, below- 
prime  borrowers  or those with  preexisting  lines of credit)  rises following 
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a tightening  of monetary  policy.8  Thus borrowers  who are truly bank- 
dependent  are squeezed  in short-term  credit  markets  by even more  than 
the Kashyap,  Stein, and Wilcox "mix"  variable  suggests. 
Friedman  and Kuttner  do not appear  to argue that bank lending is 
macroeconomically  irrelevant,  only that we should look at short-term 
credit  markets  more  broadly.  With  this conclusion  I completely  agree. 
The last finding  of the paper  that  I want  to stress is that  shocks to cor- 
porate  cash flow play an important  role in determining  prices and quan- 
tities in short-term  credit markets.  Despite the reservations  that I have 
expressed about treating  these shocks as fundamental,  it seems clear 
that the strong correlations  between cash flows and variables  such as 
commercial  paper issuance are an important  feature of the data, with 
which  future  analyses  will have to deal. Documenting  these correlations 
is a significant  contribution.  However, I would  like to correct  an impres- 
sion that  some readers  might  take  away, that  cash flow shocks represent 
some sort of alternative  hypothesis  to the credit  view. Quite  to the con- 
trary, the links between cash flows and creditworthiness  are an im- 
portant  part  of the "financial  accelerator"  mechanism  that  is at the heart 
of the credit-based  approach  to business cycles.9 In contrast, models 
with  a Brainard  number  of two or less have no means  to discuss the links 
among  cash flows, credit extension, and real activity, except in a com- 
pletely ad hoc way. 
Let me conclude by repeating  that what macroeconomics  needs is 
more  models with a Brainard  number  greater  than  two. 
Mark Gertler: The best way to understand  this  paper  is to place it in the 
context of the literature.  Three  developments  are particularly  relevant. 
The first is the work by Benjamin  M. Friedman  and Kenneth N. 
Kuttner  and James H. Stock and Mark  W. Watson  that uncovered  the 
strong  predictive  power of the six-month  commercial  paper-Treasury 
bill spread. Indeed, the spread qualified  as a "Darwinian  regressor," 
having  passed the test of the survival  of the fittest. Whether  it still de- 
serves this label  or instead  has become a victim  of the "Law  of the Fore- 
casting  Jungle"  is an issue I will take up later. 
8. Bernanke,  Gertler,  and  Gilchrist  (1993)  survey  the evidence  for this "flight-to-qual- 
ity" effect. 
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The second stage is the work by Ben S. Bernanke  and by Christina 
D. Romer  and David H. Romer  that linked  movements  in the spread  to 
monetary  policy. Using different  methods  to identify  shifts  in monetary 
policy, these authors  found  that  tightening  of monetary  policy tended  to 
raise the spread. Bernanke further proposed that this phenomenon 
might  be explained  by firms  substituting  from  bank  loans to commercial 
paper  in the wake of tight  monetary  policy. To the extent the paper  mar- 
ket is not fully liquid, a surge in paper  issues might  temporarily  widen 
the spread. 
The third  stage is the work  by Anil K. Kashyap,  Jeremy  C. Stein, and 
David W. Wilcox that pursued  the substitution  hypothesis by directly 
examining  the behavior  of credit  quantities.  Kashyap,  Stein, and  Wilcox 
found that following tight money, commercial  paper  issues in fact rise 
sharply  relative  to commercial  and  industrial  (C&I)  loans, evidence that 
is certainly  consistent  with  the substitution  hypothesis.  They also found 
that the movement  of commercial  paper  relative  to bank  loans has pre- 
dictive power for output. In Friedman  and Kuttner's  terminology,  the 
evidence suggests that the quantity  side of the money market  has pre- 
dictive power mirroring  that  of the price side. 
The objective of Friedman  and Kuttner's  paper  is to synthesize this 
literature  and pin down the underlying  economics. In the process, the 
authors  try  to draw  out the implications  for the transmission  of monetary 
policy and, more generally,  for how the performance  of credit markets 
might  influence  aggregate  activity. 
To organize  the authors'  arguments  and  my own comments,  it is use- 
ful to refer to the schematic  diagram  of the money market  in the table 
below. There are commercial  banks that hold reserves, securities, and 
loans. They fund  these assets with deposits, large  certificates  of deposit 
(large  CDs), and  equity. There  are also nonbank  intermediaries-let me 
call them money market  mutual  funds-that  issue deposits to fund the 
private instruments  of the money market. These instruments  include 
commercial  paper, large CDs, and bankers' acceptances. Despite ap- 
pearances, I am not trying  to set the record  for the Brainard  number; 
later, I explain  why I include  bankers  acceptances. 
Commercial  banks  Money market  mutual  funds 
Assets  Liabilities  Assets  Liabilities 
Reserves  Deposits  Commercial  Paper  Deposits 
Loans  Large CDs  Large CDs 
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The authors  next consider  four  hypotheses  to explain  the  joint behav- 
ior  of prices  and  quantities  in the money  market  and  aggregate  real  activ- 
ity. The first is the tight money-loan substitution  hypothesis that I al- 
luded  to earlier.  Tightening  of monetary  policy contracts  bank  deposits, 
possibly  forcing  banks  to shed loans. Borrowers  at the margin  substitute 
to the commercial  paper market;  and conversely, deposits move from 
banks to the money market. A critical assumption  throughout  is that 
banks cannot perfectly decouple loans from deposits by issuing large 
CDs; otherwise, a contraction  in deposits need not force a contraction 
in bank  loans. 
Under  the second hypothesis, the contractionary  disturbance  is a de- 
cline in bank capital. For either regulatory  or precautionary  reasons, 
banks  desire a fixed  fraction  of capital  to loans. A contraction  in capital 
thus induces substitution  of credit  flows from  banks  to money markets, 
much the same as the tight money experiment  described  above. If the 
resulting  decline  in credit  to bank-dependent  borrowers  has a noticeable 
impact on aggregate  spending, then the "capital  shock" may produce 
movements  in output  and in the prices  and  quantities  of the money mar- 
ket that  match  the data. 
The third  alternative  is the "cash  flows"  hypothesis.  The drop  in reve- 
nues that precedes a downturn  creates an increased  demand  for short- 
term funds to finance unintended  inventory accumulation  and other 
fixed  obligations.  This leads to a surge  in short-term  instruments  such as 
commercial  paper,  causing  the spread  to widen  prior  to a recession. The 
last alternative  is that  movements  in the paper-bill  spread  simply  reflect 
shifts in default  risk. 
None of the alternatives  escapes unscathed  in this analysis, although 
they fall short  by widely varying  degrees. The simple  default  risk story 
appears  the least satisfactory.  The swings in the spread  seem way too 
large  to be explained  by simple default  risk, especially given that only 
the highest  quality  firms  borrow  in the paper  market.  There  is supporting 
but  mixed  evidence  for the other  alternatives.  For  example,  the substitu- 
tion hypothesis has the strong implication  that paper and bank loans 
should  enter with equal and opposite signs in a forecasting  equation  for 
output, but the authors soundly reject this restriction.  The cash flows 
hypothesis explains the rise in paper  prior  to downturns,  but does not 
explain  why bank  loans remain  relatively  flat. 
I would  like to offer  a fifth  alternative  that  I think  fits  the facts reason- 
ably well. Let me call this alternative  the "quality  mix" hypothesis. It 
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countercyclical  demand  for short-term  credit. It adds to this notion the 
simple  idea  that  not all  borrowers  have equal  access to the credit  market. 
The high-grade  borrowers  in the commercial  paper  market  obtain  funds 
easily. Short-term  funds flow less smoothly to information-intensive 
borrowers  that must rely on banks. As a consequence, commercial  pa- 
per issues rise relative  to bank  loans at the onset of recessions. This  phe- 
nomenon  reflects a shift in the quality  mix of credit. It need not be ex- 
plained  by borrowers  substituting  between loans and paper. 
The behavior  of commercial  paper, C&I loans, corporate  earnings, 
and inventories  around  periods of tight money, as identified  by Romer 
dates, offers some descriptive  evidence in favor of the quality  mix hy- 
pothesis. A striking  regularity  is that commercial  paper surges after 
Romer  dates, as Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox found. However, the rise 
in paper  appears  to (almost  perfectly)  mirror  a decline  in corporate  earn- 
ings. These facts suggest  that  the large  high-grade  firms  in the paper  mar- 
ket borrow extensively to offset revenue shortfalls.  C&I loans do not 
similarly  surge. Bank-dependent  firms  thus do not appear  to borrow  to 
smooth out earnings  declines, at least relative  to the firms  in the paper 
market.  Differential  terms  of credit  (reflecting  the differential  quality  of 
borrowers)  could explain  this phenomenon.  ' The relative  movements  in 
paper,  loans, and earnings  are consistent  with the authors'  findings  that 
paper  is negatively  correlated  with earnings,  while C&I  loans are posi- 
tively correlated. 
The quality  mix hypothesis suggests that underlying  relative move- 
ments in commercial  paper  and bank  loans is a relative reallocation  of 
credit  from small firms  that normally  obtain  credit from banks to large 
firms  that are able to issue paper.  Around  Romer  dates, it turns  out that 
short-term  credit  for large  firms  behaves very much  like the commercial 
paper, rising  sharply  for a number  of quarters  after  tight  money. Short- 
term  credit  to small  firms,  on the other  hand,  bears  a closer resemblance 
to C&I  loans. It never rises sharply,  and actually  declines precipitously 
in several  episodes. 
1. Another  possibility  is that,  over recessions,  demand  falls  unevenly  across  small  and 
large  firms.  However, Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1993a)  show that small  firm  short-term  debt 
contracts  relative  to large  firm  short-term  debt, even after  controlling  for relative  differ- 
ences in the movement  of sales. Differences  in demand,  therefore,  do not explain  these 
results.  See also Morgan  (1992),  who uses information  from  the Survey  of Small  Business 
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On average, the mix of short-term  credit between small and large 
firms  behaves very similarly  after Romer dates to the bank  loan-com- 
mercial  paper  mix.2  Finally, a "quality  mix" effect arises within in the 
category  of C&I  loans, in that short-term  bank  loans to large  firms  rise 
sharply  after  tight  money, relative  to short-term  loans to small  firms.  In- 
deed, short-term  bank  loans to large  firms  behave  very similarly  to com- 
mercial  paper.  All these results, combined, suggest  that  the quality  mix 
hypothesis  may  account  for a substantial  part  of the relative  movements 
in the various short-term  credit aggregates  that occur both after tight 
money and  prior  to recessions. 
What  about the commercial  paper-Treasury  bill spread?  Also, why 
did  the spread  fail to anticipate  the last recession in the way it seemed to 
have anticipated  previous  recessions? I now turn  to these issues. 
Most theories of the spread, including  the authors', focus on nonfi- 
nancial  commercial  paper.  However, nonfinancial  paper  accounts  for a 
relatively  small  share  of private  money market  instruments.  Despite the 
relative growth in nonfinancial  paper issues, this instrument  still ac- 
counts for less than  20 percent  of the market.  Large  CD issues account 
for the lion's share,  more  than  half  the market. 
The next point  to note is that  all three  instruments-paper, large  CDs, 
and bankers  acceptances-appear to be close substitutes.  The rates on 
the three instruments  are virtually  identical,  and move in lockstep over 
time. Thus, while the paper-bill  spread  may have predictive  power for 
output, the same is true for the CD-bill and bankers acceptance-bill 
spreads. It seems somewhat strange,  therefore,  to restrict  attention  to 
the nonfinancial  paper  market  to try to understand  the dynamics  of the 
spread. 
Now let me explain  why I bothered  to include  bankers  acceptances  in 
the table above. These instruments  are liabilities  that are fully guaran- 
teed by banks. The underlying  risk, therefore,  involves the risk of the 
issuing  bank. The same of course is true  for large  CDs, which banks  is- 
sue directly. What is perhaps  less well understood  is that commercial 
paper  issues also typically  involve bank  risk. Except  for a few very high- 
quality  borrowers,  most paper  issuers offer, as collateral,  back-up  lines 
of credit  or guarantees  from  commercial  banks.  Any story  of the spread 
therefore  ought to feature  the behavior  (and the condition)  of commer- 
cial banks. 
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There  is, in fact, a close connection  between large  CD issues by com- 
mercial  banks and movements in the spread. Large CD issues tend to 
surge around  periods of tight money, and the spread tends to widen 
when the growth  rate  of large  CDs rises. Tight  money forces banks  into 
the CD market  to fund  their  asset positions, as shown  in the table  above. 
In addition,  banks  also float  CDs (at least partially)  to accommodate  the 
rise in the demand  for short-term  credit that stems from the decline in 
cash flows induced  by tight  money. For related  reasons (discussed ear- 
lier), nonfinancial  paper  rises, although  CD issues dominate  the move- 
ment  in the broad  money market  aggregates. 
Note that the surge in money market  instruments  comes at a time 
when banks  are pressured  both by tight money and a downturn  in eco- 
nomic activity. This might explain the rise in the spread on private 
money market  instruments,  especially given that the payoffs on these 
instruments  are ultimately  contingent  on bank  performance. 
This story also explains why the spread  failed to signal  the previous 
recession. First, tightening  of monetary  policy did not closely precede 
the recession, in contrast  to the previous downturns.  Monetary  policy 
was tight  during  1988.  And  both  large  CD issues and  the spread  rose dur- 
ing this time. However, monetary  policy began  to ease well prior  to the 
downturn.  A second key factor  involved  problems  in banking.  The com- 
bination  of high  loan losses and the implementation  of new capital  stan- 
dards  under  the Basle Accord  induced  banks  to cut back  asset positions. 
One  manifestation  was a huge  drop-off  in CD issues. This  drop-off  began 
in 1989  and continued  through  the recession. Thus, in contrast  to previ- 
ous recessions, the supply of private money market  instruments  was 
contracting  rather  than  rising  as the downturn  settled  in. For  this reason, 
the spread  did not rise. In this vein, the failure  of the spread  to signal 
the recent  downturn  simply  suggests  that  there  was something  different 
about the last recession, and not that the spread  has become an irrele- 
vant concept. 
I would  like to conclude  with some comments  on the general  problem 
of identification  in time-series  models. Much of the empirical  work in- 
volves tracing  out the response  of various  financial  prices  and  quantities 
to a set of orthogonalized  innovations  in variables  such as interest  rates, 
cash flow, and  default  risk. Because these variables  are not truly  exoge- 
nous, it is often difficult  to know how to interpret  these results. What, 
for example, drives a cash flow shock? Knowing  the answer, I think, is 
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A related issue is that, as is well known, the dynamic response to 
shocks depends  in general  on identifying  restrictions  on the interaction 
between the contemporaneous  innovations. The uniform  assumption 
that the authors  make is that monetary  policy always contemporane- 
ously affects the financial  variable  of interest, but that the behavior  of 
the financial  variable  does not instantly  affect the course of monetary 
policy. 
Under  the authors'  identifying  restrictions  about  the impact  of mone- 
tary  policy on the behavior  of C&I  loans, tightening  of monetary  policy 
produces  a rise in C&I  loans. This rise is due mainly  to an instantaneous 
jump at the time of the tight money shock. The cash flows hypothesis 
could  explain  a rise in loans, as revenues  eventually  decline  and  invento- 
ries eventually creep up. But this should take time to play out, and 
should not resemble an instantaneous,  once-and-for-all  jump in loans. 
Indeed, the authors'  results  indicate  that  inventories  do not rise until  at 
least a quarter  after  the shock. 
Another possible explanation  for the sharp instantaneous  jump in 
loans is simultaneity.  The Fed may be tightening  in response  to a boom 
in bank  credit, or else a boom in some other variable  that is correlated 
with rising  bank credit. In this instance, the positive blip in C&I loans 
associated  with a positive funds rate shock simply  reflects  reverse cau- 
sation. I recomputed  the response of bank  loans to tight  money, under 
the assumption that monetary policy reacts contemporaneously  to 
movements in bank loans-and  not vice versa-and  found that C&I 
loans do not rise. Thus, the outcome is highly sensitive to the a priori 
restrictions.  All this suggests that it is important  to carefully  justify the 
identifying  assumptions. 
General Discussion 
Several panel members followed up on Ben Bernanke's comment 
about  how many  assets need to be included  in a macroeconomic  model 
used to analyze monetary  policy. Greg  Mankiw  suggested  that a Brain- 
ard-Tobin  number  of two is  just fine  for understanding  the basic  issues of 
monetary  and fiscal policy. Benjamin  Friedman  and Mark  Gertler  both 
disagreed,  arguing  that the required  number  of assets depends on the 
question  being  analyzed;  more  than two assets must be included  to un- 
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economy. Friedman  argued  further  that  models with  just two assets are 
rejected  empirically,  and can not account  for the predictive  power of fi- 
nancial  market  variables  like the paper-bill  spread.  Friedman  and  James 
Tobin  both pointed  out that a Brainard-Tobin  number  greater  than two 
is not always sufficient  to yield a model  with  a credit  channel.  For exam- 
ple, a model  with  three  assets-money,  bonds, and  capital-may be suf- 
ficient  to analyze crowding  out, but would be unable  to assess the role 
of credit. Friedman  suggested  that including  "inside"  assets and liabili- 
ties is crucial  for understanding  the interaction  of financial  and real ac- 
tivity;  this effectively rules  out representative  agent  models. Tobin  sug- 
gested inclusion  of long-term  assets, including  mortgages  and  long-term 
Treasury  securities, noting  that their rates had behaved somewhat  dif- 
ferently than rates on assets of shorter  maturity  during  the recent epi- 
sode. Tobin also suggested  it would be desirable  to include  the stock of 
assets-in  addition  to the flows-because  much of the action likely is 
coming from short-term  dynamics of stock adjustment.  Ralph Bryant 
added  that it would be important,  for at least some issues, to include  fi- 
nancial  aspects of the foreign  sector in the model, as well. 
James  Medoff  suggested  that  the impact  of financial  events on the la- 
bor market  in recent years could be understood  in terms  of the portfolio 
approach  in this paper. In particular,  labor's  claim on the firm  could be 
viewed as a liability.  Medoff noted that the ratio of permanent  to total 
job losses has been extremely high recently, and that workers aged 
thirty-five  to fifty-four  have been especially hard  hit. At the same time, 
the ratio of corporate  net interest  to cash flow has been very high. Be- 
cause firms  adjust  to high  debt ratios  by reducing  their  real  liabilities  as 
well as financial  ones, it is not surprising  that  they have attempted  to re- 
duce the claims  of labor.  Middle-aged  employees  are  hardest  hit  because 
they represent  the largest  net liability  in present  value terms,  given their 
age-earnings  profiles. 
There  were several comments  about  the difficulty  of identification  in 
this type of research, as well as general  comments  about the empirical 
analysis. Chris Sims illustrated  the difficulty  of identification,  using as 
an example  the robust  finding  that  interest  rate  innovations  are  followed 
by increases in inflation.  If interest  innovations  are regarded  as mone- 
tary policy shocks, this suggests that policy is itself responding  to the 
sources  of inflation.  When  variables  are added  that  might  be regarded  as 
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change  rates, or other auction  market  prices-it  appears  that  monetary 
policy  tightens  in response  to inflationary  news and  is followed  by reces- 
sion. This  raises  the possibility  that  recessions  conventionally  attributed 
to monetary  policy may largely  be attributed  to nonmonetary  shocks. If 
this view is correct, monetary  contractions  should  not be credited  with 
causal  significance.  Similarly  other  financial  market  indicators-such as 
the mix of commercial  paper and loans-that  appear to play an im- 
portant  role might  just be proxying  for the true shocks. 
Several panel members  suggested  other reasons for questioning  the 
reliability  of the paper-bill  spread  as a macroeconomic  indicator.  Martin 
Baily suggested  that  just two episodes-1974-75  and 1979-82-were re- 
sponsible  for its apparent  importance,  and that this variable  should  not 
have been expected to remain  a useful predictor.  Mankiw  was also sus- 
picious  of the paper-bill  spread.  He noted  that  the variable  was identified 
as a predictor  only after researchers  extensively reviewed macroeco- 
nomic variables.  Mankiw  added  that the NBER index of recession that 
relied  heavily on the paper-bill  spread  variable  failed to predict  the first 
recession after  the index's debut  in the late 1980s.  Kenneth  Kuttner  de- 
fended the paper-bill  spread  by pointing  out that a number  of other fi- 
nancial indicators, including  monetary aggregates  and interest rates, 
also failed  to predict  the latest recession. 
Robert Shiller noted that the commercial  loan rate is, in effect, a 
longer-term  rate than the rate on commercial  paper, because firms  ex- 
pect their  relationships  with banks  to extend past the lifetime  of a loan. 
Therefore,  incorporating  lags of the loan-paper  spread  into the models 
might improve their fit. He also suggested that the impulse response 
functions  be recalculated  with  monthly  data,  as a robustness  check. Dan 
Sichel cautioned that the asymmetry between positive and negative 
monetary  shocks may require  researchers  to differentiate  between ex- 
pansionary  and contractionary  periods;  three ways to do this would be 
to run separate  regressions  over expansion  and contraction  periods, to 
include  dummy  variables  for Romer  dates, and to use techniques  to dif- 
ferentiate  between  the impulse  response  functions  for positive  and  nega- 
tive innovations. 
Robert Gordon noted the awkwardness  of estimating  a model de- 
signed  to illuminate  the credit  crunch  using  data  spanning  the last twenty 
years when so many features of the recent recession are quite distinc- 
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predictive  power  of interest  rates  and  interest  rate  spreads;  instability  in 
MI and  M2  velocity; the failure  of everything  to do with bank  loans;  and 
the massive shift  out of the banking  system into bond  and  equity  mutual 
funds. In addition,  the usual  "laundry  list"  of possible  explanations  have 
not yet been sorted  out. These include  high  ratios  of debt  to income, the 
S&L debacle, and tighter bank regulation.  Gordon suggested that an 
analysis of the recent out-of-sample  properties  of Friedman  and Kutt- 
ner's model  could be especially  helpful. 
Finally, Tobin told an anecdote that showed both the importance  of 
the issues raised by Friedman  and Kuttner  and how differently  some 
people in the banking  industry  view the recent behavior  of credit mar- 
kets. He related  a comment  of the CEO of Citibank  speaking  at the re- 
cent economic summit  in Little Rock. In Tobin's paraphrase,  "If you 
want $80 billion to $100 billion of stimulus  without any effect on the 
deficit,  just tell the regulators  to ease up on the banks, and we'll take 
care of it." Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  281 
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